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SUMMARY
The service sector has been identified as the main force of economic and po-
tentially sustainable growth in most developed economies (Rothenberg, 2007). Nev-
ertheless, despite the role of services in today’s economy, little is known about what
drives service innovation and which tools and methods determine successful service
design and development. This dissertation focuses on addressing the challenges as-
sociated with the design, development and operation of service offerings. In the first
essay (Chapter II) we explore the design challenges of an organization that develops
an experiential service. In experiential services, the customer value extends beyond
the functional benefits of the service, and it encompasses the overall experience. We
draw upon the perspective of the customer journey, which is widely used by design
firms (e.g., IDEO), and we model the entire service experience as a process comprising
individual service steps (also known as touchpoints). The value of the service is “co-
produced” over several touchpoints between the customer and the service provider.
We identify the non-monotonic effects of the co-production losses and service complex-
ity on the provider’s design decisions, (i.e., price), and the touchpoints she controls.
Finally, we fully characterize the conditions under which the service provider may
use these design decisions to effectively signal the experience potential of the service
offering. In the second essay (Chapter III) we study the auto manufacturer’s choice
regarding whether to provide mobility service (e.g., car sharing) in conjunction with
the traditional sales channel. A utility maximization model is used to characterize
the consumer’s choice between purchasing a vehicle, benefiting from the mobility ser-
vice or relying on an outside option (e.g., public transportation). We characterize
the benefit to the manufacturer of providing mobility service and the environmental
xvi
implications of this strategy. In the third essay (Chapter IV) we study the impli-
cations of “reference point” effects on the optimal service design. We envision the
service delivery as a two-stage process in which customer satisfaction is stochastic.
The service provider needs to determine the optimal level of effort to exert at each
stage, given that the customer experience at the first stage of the process can affect




In recent years, the competitive landscape in which firms operate has undergone a
revolution in character. One of the main drivers of this change has been the fact that
many firms and economies are shifting from product-oriented to service-oriented mar-
kets (Insight, 2007). This transition is further illustrated by the entry of traditionally
manufacturing-focused organizations such as IBM, Kodak, GE, and GM into business
and financing services (Sawhney et al., 2003). The service sector has been identified
as the main force of economic and potentially sustainable growth in most developed
economies (Rothenberg, 2007). Therefore, the need for successful design and devel-
opment of services has emerged as a crucial business element. Yet, despite the role of
services in today’s economy, little is known about what drives service innovation and
which tools and methods determine a successful service design and development. Frei
(2008) observes that most service-focused firms rely on tools that were designed to
tackle the challenges of product-focused companies. Most of the NPD tools, however,
do not address the challenges unique to the nature of services (e.g., customers’ in-
volvement in the value creation process; see Sasser, 1976); therefore, their application
to new service design and development is rendered problematic. This dissertation
focuses on addressing the challenges associated with the design, development and
operation of service offerings.
In the first essay presented in Chapter I, we explore the basic challenges that an
organization faces in the design and introduction of an experiential service. In ex-
periential services, the customer value extends beyond the functional benefits of the
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service, and it encompasses the overall experience. We build upon the customer jour-
ney, a widely adopted concept in service design, which views a service as a collection
of interaction touchpoints between the customer and the service provider that create
a holistic experience. We model the service experience as a process comprised of
sequential touchpoints, and we focus on the provider’s design decisions: the number
of service touchpoints she chooses to control, and the price she charges. Our results
reveal the non-monotonic effects of the interactions between the provider and the
customer. These interactions may assume the form of losses (due to the difficulty to
fully match the customer needs), or they may determine the subsequent experiences
(touchpoint dependencies). We fully characterize when the service provider may use
the service design to effectively signal her true underlying capability in service provi-
sion. A separating equilibrium can be attained depending on the capability as proxied
by the cost structure: the “capable” type provider successfully reveals her type either
by signaling expertise (i.e., controlling fewer touchpoints) or by signaling efficiency
(i.e., controlling more touchpoints). The service price is used only as a signaling
mechanism of last resort. Yet, as the value associated with capability increases a
pooling equilibrium dominates.
The second essay presented in Chapter III is motivated by the observation that, in
recent years, manufacturers from various industries have begun to orient their prac-
tices towards the provision of solutions (e.g., mobility, lighting, carpeting solutions) as
opposed to strictly selling their products. This trend, known as servicization, reveals
the transition from a product ownership economy to a functional or service economy.
Servicization is characterized by the emergence of product-based services, also known
as Product-Service-Systems, which blur the distinction between manufacturing and
traditional service activities. Product-Service-Systems can be thought of as a market
proposition that extends the traditional functionality of a product by incorporating
additional services. Here the emphasis is placed on the “sale of use” rather than the
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“sale of product.” In this essay, we examine the extent to which such practices ex-
ist in the transportation business. Solution-orientated models in the transportation
business are mainly manifested through leasing, rental, and membership schemes. In-
terestingly, we observe significant differences in the popularity and maturity of such
models between the private jet and automobile industries. For instance, the private
jet industry has explored a variety of options, with a number of jet manufacturers
offering the full spectrum from selling and leasing to jet membership. Only recently,
big auto manufacturers (e.g., BMW) announced their intention to expand the scope
of their business by introducing car membership schemes (Fuhrmans, 2010). The
novelty and increasing popularity of the car sharing business models, along with the
growing interest of the business press, motivate us to explore such models (e.g., Zip-
car). In this essay, we focus on the auto manufacturer’s dilemma regarding whether to
sell a product, provide a mobility solution, or do both. We use a discrete/continuous
demand model to capture consumers’ self-selection and usage optimization decisions,
which serve as input to the manufacturer’s problem. Through our numerical analysis
we are able to characterize three different decision levels. Specifically, by going back-
wards we characterize i) customers’ usage adjustment, ii) customers’ (discrete) choice
of transportation mode, and iii) manufacturers’ production and price decisions. With
respect to the latter decision level, the manufacturers’ production decisions encom-
pass the number of vehicles offered through a traditional selling and/or membership
scheme, and price decisions encompass the vehicle selling price and the membership
fee. The environmental implications of such Product-Service-System are also assessed.
The third essay, presented in Chapter IV, studies the implications of “reference
point” effects on service design by utilizing a process-based view of services. The
novelty of the process-based view of services (also adopted in Chapter I) resides in
the realization that, in services, customer value is not generated solely during the
3
transaction point or the “core” offering of the service. Under this new conceptual-
ization, a service provider can decide how much effort to allocate not only at the
transaction point but also before it. In order to increase the likelihood of customers
joining the service system, the provider may exert costly effort before the “core” of
the service without obliging the customers to commit to a price. However, customers
may form and anchor to an “experience reference point.” Provided that customers
decide to join the service system, experiences at the “core” offering that fall below
that reference point can cause customer disconfirmation, which negatively impacts
the provider’s profit. In this context we formulate and characterize the optimal effort
allocation decisions of the service provider.
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CHAPTER II
THE DESIGN CHALLENGES OF EXPERIENTIAL
SERVICES
2.1 Introduction
Consider a restaurant enthusiast visiting the city of San Diego, CA. During his visit,
he can choose among a variety of dining establishments, like the the Gaslamp Club
A Steak Place, located in the vibrant Gaslamp district. This well-known Californian
steak lounge lets the customers “grill their own selection of steak” and thereby del-
egates the food preparation responsibility to them (Cohn Restaurant Group, 2011).
Nevertheless, the meat selection is tightly controlled by the restaurant chef to ensure
superb quality. Contrast this service experience with another equally unconventional
restaurant experience: the Real Chow Baby restaurant, in Atlanta, GA. There, cus-
tomers choose from a wide variety of different ingredients and prepare a combination
of their own inspiration. Then, they let the chefs assume the cooking responsibility
based on generic guidelines (e.g., medium-well cooking; The Real Chow Baby Team,
2011).
Design differentiation across service offerings is a common practice across business
settings. Providers choose different designs to cater to the same customer need (e.g.,
to dine or rent movies), in an effort to drive commercial success. In the movie rental
business, Netflix revamped the traditional process, as represented by Blockbuster.1
In essence, Netflix assumed responsibility for a part of the service process that Block-
buster did not. For instance, Netflix customers received weekly email updates about
1This was the case until August 2004. Then, Blockbuster launched an online DVD rental service
(CNET News, 2004).
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new releases, while Blockbuster customers relied on their own independent sources of
information (e.g., word of mouth).
The design of service offerings, however, presents unique challenges: customers in-
teract with the provider during the service delivery process in complex and uncertain
ways to co-produce the service outcome (Sasser, 1976). Thus, the realized customer
value often extends beyond the functional benefits of the service task, and it encom-
passes the overall interaction experience. High experiences may vary depending on
the objective of the service offering. Customers may appreciate the streamlined effi-
ciency in service completion (as in Netflix’s case), or they may enjoy the high quality
of the service output (as in the Gaslamp restaurant case). At the same time, it is
extremely hard for a customer to know a priori the capability of a provider to offer
such a high experience, especially for new service offerings. Therefore, the presence
of information asymmetry further complicates the customer-provider interaction and
hinders the design decisions.
In response to these challenges, service providers actively account for the customer
perspective (Chase and Dasu, 2001; Frei, 2008) during the design process to capitalize
on the experiential component of the service (Pine and Gilmore, 1998; Voss et al.,
2008). Design firms like IDEO (Bhavnani and Sosa, 2006) employ an approach that
systematically captures the “determinants” of the customer experience: the customer
journey (Richardson, 2010a,b,c; Gamerman, 2011). The origins of the customer jour-
ney concept can be traced back to Shostack (1984) and the service blueprints. Each
experiential service is represented as a journey during which the customer satisfies his
need(s) through distinct experiences created at consecutive stages (i.e., touchpoints,
also termed service encounters; Roth and Menor, 2003). The overall customer experi-
ence results from the accumulation of touchpoint experiences. Through the customer
journey, designers question whether they should create more or fewer touchpoints by
controlling parts of the service encounter, and therefore by enabling interaction with
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the customer. The usefulness of the customer journey perspective has been advocated
in a variety of service contexts. For example, Vossoughi (2010) argues that in health-
care services the lack of consideration of the patient journey has resulted in service
task fragmentation and has compromised the patient experience.
In this paper, we develop a model to capture the design challenges that a ser-
vice provider (henceforth “she”) faces in an experiential service. The provider’s main
design decisions include the selection of the customer journey touchpoints that she
controls and the price she charges for the service. A successful service offering strives
to balance two forces: the downside that the customer (henceforth “he”) may ex-
perience due to the uncertain outcome of a customer-provider interaction and the
experience benefit that a potentially capable provider can offer. Even in the ab-
sence of information asymmetry, we find that the optimal design decisions depend
non-monotonically on two important parameters: i) the variability of the experien-
tial outcome from touchpoint interactions and ii) the underlying interdependencies
between the service tasks, which may give rise to correlated experiential outcomes
across touchpoints. Even when the provision of the entire customer journey is cost-
less, the service provider optimally chooses to control only part of the journey, as long
as some touchpoint interdependencies exist.
When information asymmetry is present, we outline conditions under which the
service provider uses the service design to signal her capability to offer high expe-
rience. Our results indicate that a service provider signals her capability through
different service designs depending on the service objective. When a high experience
is associated with a streamlined, cost-efficient process (i.e., the provider can complete
the service tasks at a lower cost), then she credibly signals her capability through an
extended set of touchpoints. By contrast, when high experience reflects the customer
appreciation for the outcome quality of the service task (a feature of expertise-based
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but costly provision), signaling takes place through a focused offering on key touch-
points. Under certain conditions, the choice of touchpoints is inadequate to signal the
provider’s capability, and therefore she resorts to pricing as a signaling mechanism.
2.2 Literature
Our work draws upon two streams of research in the service management literature.
The first stream studies the role of customer involvement in the design decisions of
a service provider. The second stream analyzes the operational implications from
different customer-provider interactions.
2.2.1 Service Design and the Role of the Customer
Customer engagement during the service delivery process has been identified early on
as a challenge unique to service environments (Sasser, 1976). A series of studies has
tried to determine whether customer engagement is beneficial or detrimental to the
service provider. On one side, Chase (1978), Chase (1981), and Chase and Tansik
(1983) argue that further customer participation comes at the expense of operating
efficiency. On the other hand, Lovelock and Young (1979) suggest that customers
can be an indispensable source of labor that may lead to productivity gains for the
provider, to the extent that customers can be viewed as “partial” employees (Mills
and Morris, 1986). Shostack (1987) is the first to argue that the effect of customer
participation in the service outcome is not unequivocal and needs to be carefully
incorporated into the service design. In two influential articles (Shostack, 1984, 1987),
she proposes that every service offering can be mapped as a process consisting of
distinct steps, and through such a breakdown the provider can identify where to
improve the interaction and further engage the customer.
This stream of research serves as the theoretical foundation of our work. We
contribute to this area by formally modeling the service design decisions as dependent
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on the degree of customer involvement.2 We identify customer involvement to be
positive or negative depending on two important parameters: the variability of the
customer-provider interaction outcome and the interdependencies among the service
tasks.
2.2.2 Service Design and the Role of Operational Variability.
The Operations Management literature has extensively studied the effect of variability
in service systems. Specifically, customer involvement has received attention as a
primary source of variability. We classify this stream of literature into studies that
have assumed service systems composed of either a single stage or multiple stages
(i.e., touchpoints in our context).
Modeling services as a single touchpoint: studies close to our setting (Debo
et al., 2008; Anand et al., 2011), conceptualize service design as the selection of
price and service rates. Then, customer involvement is only determined through the
adjustment of the customer arrival rate. An exception is Ha (1998), who conceptu-
alizes customer involvement through the choice of their own service rate. However,
such self-optimization behavior results in socially suboptimal service rates due to in-
creased congestion effects. Still, remedy through the proper design is constrained
only to pricing decisions. However, such a conceptualization of customer involvement
only mitigates the congestion effects and never benefits the provider. Conversely, we
do not “predispose” the provider against interaction with the customer. In experien-
tial services, customer involvement extends beyond the congestion effects and it may
drive higher or lower service experiences.
Modeling services assuming multiple touchpoints: most studies in that
stream consider only two touchpoints to rein the mathematical complexity (Shumsky
2Recent studies (Xue and Field, 2008; Roels et al., 2010; White and Badinelli, 2010) analyze
formal contractual implications for the customer-provider interaction. Instead, we consider settings
where formal contracts would be difficult to enforce, and we analyze how the service design decisions
depend on the nature of the customer-provider interaction.
9
and Pinker, 2003; Lee et al., 2009). However, they do not consider any customer
engagement. An exception is a study by Xue and Harker (2003) who consider a
two-stage service process comprising two servers in tandem. At the first stage, the
provider allows customers to perform self-service tasks. Then, she lets them join the
queue of the second stage performed by her. Due to the exogenous nature of customer
efficiency and firm cost structure, the provider either engages the customer fully or
not at all. We contest this finding in our analysis.
Similar to all these studies, we acknowledge the provider’s decision to get cus-
tomers actively involved during the service as well as the presence of variability in
most service systems. Nevertheless, we do not restrict our attention to stochastic
arrival or service rates as possible sources of variability. Instead, we recognize that
in experiential services the effects of variability may stem from more fundamental
sources such as the nature of the customer-provider interaction and the underlying
structure of the service tasks.
2.3 The Model
In this section, we outline the model assumptions, namely the context of the service,
and the structural elements of the provider’s and the customers’ decisions.
2.3.1 Service Context
Ulrich and Ellison (1999) suggest that the design of products and services benefits
more from a “holistic” perspective, that is, the entire set of actions and decisions
that a consumer undergoes in order to satisfy his need. Within experiential services,
the concept of customer journey (Bhavnani and Sosa, 2006; Voss et al., 2007) offers
such a perspective. It proposes that the customer experience builds cumulatively over
several touchpoints, much before and after the transaction touchpoint, a core focus
of the traditional service design.
We formalize the customer journey as a set of n distinct steps, i.e., J = {1, 2, . . . , n}
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that aim to satisfy a specific customer need and create a high experience. The defini-
tion of a high experience is contingent on the objective and the nature of the service
task. The service objective may represent a streamlined, cost-efficient task comple-
tion, or the high quality outcome of a service (Parasuraman et al., 1985, 1991). Ser-
vice providers may exhibit different capabilities in ensuring high experiences. Thus,
a provider can be of type θ and exhibit high (θ = H) or low (θ = L) capability in
offering high experience.3 At the same time, the service touchpoints may create inter-
dependent, complex effects on the customer’s experience4 at a specific touchpoint due
to the nature of the service tasks. Therefore, the experience that customers obtain
at the completion of the ith touchpoint may depend on prior realized experiences.
For instance, consider a visit to a health care provider. If early on the nurse
fails to fully understand and record the symptoms and health history or the patient
fails to effectively communicate that information, then the subsequent diagnostic and
treatment experience will likely be imperiled. A similar situation (with hopefully less
detrimental results) may occur when placing a restaurant order. A less capable mâıtre
d’ may adversely affect the dining experience due to an order that is mismatched to
the customer preference. In contrast, standardized and automated settings like fast
food or bank transaction services contain fairly straightforward independent touch-
points in terms of their contribution to the customer overall experience.
2.3.2 Customer Experience
Consider a customer who seeks to satisfy a particular need (e.g., diagnosis and treat-
ment from a health care provider), and he must go through a specific customer journey.
Let us assume that each step5 can be performed by either the consumer himself, or
3We elaborate on this assumption in §3.3.
4A more accurate term would be instant utility. We use the terms “instant utility,” “transfor-
mation function of instant utility,” and “predicted utility” as presented and explained in Kahneman
et al. (1997).
5In the rest of the paper we use the terms steps and touchpoints interchangeably.
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an expert service provider. The per-step experience depends on the entity e ∈ {θ, C}
(high, low-type provider or customer respectively) that performs it. Customers hold
a prior belief φ ∈ (0, 1) that the provider is of high type.
We admit to a basic service reality up-front: the experience enjoyed at a service
step is ex-ante described by a random variable Ṽ ei ∼ N (V ei , σ2e) ∀i ∈ J and e ∈
{θ, C}. Through Ṽ ei , we capture the fact that it is almost impossible to predict an
exact experience. The mean and variance carry a very intuitive meaning: the mean
represents the systemic functional contribution to the customer experience during
the service step, whereas the variance represents the idiosyncratic (interaction and
moment-specific) experience gain or loss that may take place. Berry et al. (2002) refer
to those two major components as “the clues that make up the customer experience.”
Regarding the functional component, V ei , we consider the meaningful case where
the customer benefits from the provider controlling a step of the process (V θi ≥ V Ci ).
This benefit represents the added value that a dedicated provider brings (i.e., service
configurations, or actions the customer may be unaware of, such as best practices in
food selection, preparation, and presentation). Let the functional contribution at each
step be V θi where i ∈ Pθ ⊆ J = {1, . . . , n}; Pθ indicates the subset of touchpoints
controlled by a provider of capability θ. Given our definition of θ we assume V Hi ≥ V Li .
Additional benefits due to high capability capture the psychological safety derived
when treated by a recognized expert provider. For instance, the assurance a patient
feels when he thinks he is receiving treatment from a very knowledgeable doctor, or
the stress avoidance that a customer enjoys knowing that he will be served fast in a
deli, or the peace of mind a parent has when he presumes that his children will be
kept at the best daycare. Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons (2007) and Roth and Menor
(2003) refer to such benefits as the implicit service elements of a service offering.
Due to his lower expertise on the nature of the service tasks, the customer realizes
a smaller per-step functional experience V Ci with i ∈ C = J \Pθ, i.e., the subset of
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touchpoints delegated to the customer.
Regarding the idiosyncratic component of the experience, we assume that each
customer-provider interaction differs regarding the experience realization. For in-
stance, the same customer may enjoy a different dining experience at a specific
restaurant even if every time that he visits he is served by the same waiter, sits
at the same table, and consumes the same food at the same time of the day. This
random feature is a unique characteristic of service environments. It arises primarily
from the fact that customers actively participate and co-create the service outcome
(Voss et al., 2008). For a variety of reasons, such as asymmetric task expertise,
fuzzy cross-communication, or even limited comprehension skills, we assume that the
idiosyncratic component of the experience is more variable at the touchpoints con-
trolled by the provider (Terwiesch and Loch, 2004). Thus, we assume σ2C = δσ
2
θ
with δ ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ {H,L}. This variability shall not be confused with the
“operational” variability introduced by customers’ involvement in the service deliv-
ery process and which can cause inefficiencies (e.g., waiting times). In our model
we capture such inefficiencies through the value V Ci < V
P
i . For tractability reasons
we assume that the variability introduced is independent of the provider capability.6
Note that due to the possible interdependencies among different service tasks, the re-
alizations of the experiences Ṽ ei across the respective touchpoints may be correlated
with correlation ρ > 0.
To further illustrate the roles of V ei and σ
2
e in our model, consider again the patient
seeking diagnosis and treatment. Let us assume that the customer is currently at the
Registration touchpoint of the patient journey. Depending on the specific healthcare
provider, contemplate the following two service design scenarios: i) the customer is
6Our assumption is not restrictive. In fact, we capture the capability effects through the mean
per-step experience, as opposed through the variance. One could envision a scenario where the mean
is common across and the variance is capability dependent. We have performed additional analysis
which shows that our results remain qualitatively the same.
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supposed to self-check-in and self-report his symptoms and medical history by filling
out all the appropriate forms, or ii) specialized personnel (e.g., nurses) are responsi-
ble for the patient’s registration. In the latter case, a nurse ensures that registration
happens in a smooth and timely fashion without unnecessary trial-and-error attempts
(e.g., fields missing from the registration form). Using our terminology, this corre-
sponds to V NurseRegistration > V
Patient
Registration. However, in the event that a nurse controls
the registration, the idiosyncratic component of the touchpoint experience can add
or subtract customer value. For instance, a patient may perceive the presence of a
nurse as rather intrusive, and for that reason he may feel uncomfortable to share
details of his medical history and symptoms (Ṽ NurseRegistration < V
Nurse
Registration). On the
other hand, it may also be possible that the patient considers the nurse helpful,
friendly, and/or reassuring, and thus finds it easier to provide the necessary informa-
tion (Ṽ NurseRegistration > V
Nurse
Registration). Since the patient’s self-registration experience is not




More formally, if the provider controls the set of touchpoints Pθ ⊆ J and charges
a price pθ then the overall experience realization that each customer may derive from











Ṽ Ci − pθ ∼ N (µV , σ2V ) (1)
with Ṽ ei ∼ N (V ei , σ2e) ∀e ∈ {θ, C} and µV , σ2V as defined in Lemma 1 in the Ap-
pendix. Validation of the cumulative experience assumption has come from psychol-
ogy research (Loewenstein et al., 1993; Ariely and Zauberman, 2003). The first term
of equation (1) captures the overall experience that the customer derives from the
subset of touchpoints that the θ-type provider controls. The second term expresses
the experience from the touchpoints that the customer self-performs, and the third
7The subjective experience components are not customer specific. They do not represent a con-
sumer “type”, and cannot be used as segmentation levers. For example, the same patient could po-
tentially experience a Ṽ NurseRegistration > V
Nurse





during another. As such the experience realization cannot be predetermined.
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term is the price that the customer pays for receiving the service.8
2.3.3 Provider Capability
The profit-maximizing service provider can deliver high (a “high-type provider”) or
low (a “low-type provider”) per step experience. Recall that V Hi > V
L
i and that the
exact definition of a high experience describes different service objectives. Mapping
these differing objectives to the relative magnitude of the marginal provision costs al-
lows us to represent two important cases: when the customer appreciates streamlined
service completion, we posit that he expects high experience from the provider with
the low marginal provision cost, i.e., cH < cL; on the contrary, when the customer
associates high experiences with a high quality outcome (e.g., a medical diagnosis),
he expects these outcomes to require high marginal provision costs, and therefore
cH > cL.
Given the overall context of information asymmetry, the provider’s design decision
involves two dimensions which also act as signals about her capability: which touch-
points to control (Pθ) and what price pθ to charge. After observing the provider’s




, customers update their prior φ to the posterior φ′ = φ′ (m)
and based on that they decide whether to seek service. The total number of cus-
tomers that decide to join the provider’s service system is M (φ′,m). Therefore, the













M (φ′,m) . (2)
Equations (1) and (2) show how our model captures a fundamental trade-off in
services: the provider can offer greater functional benefit to a customer by controlling
8It is assumed that the price for the service offering is guaranteed to be paid once the customer
joins the service. Alternatively, we assume that the customer will proceed through all the service
upon requesting the offering as he finds it prohibitively expensive to renege. The relaxation of this
assumption is left for future research.
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an increased number of touchpoints. Yet, as she controls many touchpoints, she
assumes greater variability in the realized experiences and fails to ensure a smooth
service process. Figure 1 depicts our service process, and in the Appendix we provide
a summary of the notation used throughout the paper.
Provider is responsible for the 
service steps
Customer is responsible for 
the service steps
Figure 1: Customer journey in the service system. For ease of exposition, i) we
assume that the service provider chooses to control the first k steps of the customer
journey. Our analysis holds without such a restrictive assumption. ii) Only the
correlation ρ between the sequential steps is shown. Our model assumes the same
pair-wise correlation across all touchpoints.
2.3.4 Sequence of Events
Initially, nature selects the service provider’s type θ ∈ {H,L} and the customers’
prior belief φ. The type θ is communicated only to the provider while φ is known
to both the provider and the customer. Both customers and provider associate high
provider capability with a cost structure (i.e., cH > cL or cH < cL). Then the provider
designs the service, that is, she commits to a number of touchpoints she will control
through an up-front, irreversible investment (e.g., choice of specific equipment and/or
training of personnel). For a set of touchpoints Pθ, the provider sets the price pθ she
will charge for the service. Recall that the customer faces uncertainty regarding the
provider capability. Specifically, customers hold a prior belief φ ∈ (0, 1), which after









Clearly, the customer-provider interaction may result in more or less gratifying
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experiences. However, this uncertain nature of the experience has adverse effects on
the customers’ prior to the service decision to request the offering. We approximate
such a behavioral trait through customer risk aversion. Namely, we assume that
customers prefer less variable and more uniform service experiences.9 We capture
the customer’s risk aversion through an appropriate, non-decreasing transformation




. The customer observes the general features of the









(Kahneman et al., 1997).





















θ, pθ = 0,Pθ = ∅
))]
i.e., the utility he expects to derive from self-
performing the entire journey.
2.4 Analysis
We begin with the analysis of the full information case, i.e., φ = 1 (no uncertainty
about the provider capability). We eliminate references to a type θ and instead we
use the identifier P . This analysis allows us to describe the effects of the service task
parameters on the optimal design decisions, and it offers a benchmark setting. Then,
we proceed with the information asymmetry setting. All proofs are detailed in the
Appendix.
2.4.1 Service Design Under Full Information
2.4.1.1 Customer’s Problem.





= −e−rṼ , where r > 0 indicates the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion (Varian, 1992). Given that we assume full information, the provider
9Contemplate the example of a customer deciding upon entering a new restaurant for the first
time. Although, the restaurant experience presents an upside, it can also lead to rather painful
downsides, e.g., food poisoning etc. The effect of the hedonic profile of an experience on the overall
evaluation of an event has been extensively studied in the field of psychology (Varey and Kahneman,
1992; Loewenstein et al., 1993; Ariely and Zauberman, 2000).
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capability is fully known when the decision to seek service is taken. A customer will



















is derived in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
2.4.1.2 Provider’s Problem.
Let F be the sigma-algebra of all possible subsets of J . The design challenges of the



















Without loss of generality, we normalize M = 1. Then, for a design configuration
(p,P) the provider faces non-zero demand as long as she prices below an upper limit,
which depends on the selected touchpoints (Lemma 3 presents the formal argument
in the Appendix). Intuitively, the provider chooses to charge the maximum possible










Ṽ (p = 0,P = ∅)
)]
, because
the profit function in equation (2) is increasing in p. Then, p∗ = p̄(P) and M ·
1{E[U(Ṽ (p,P))]≥E[U(Ṽ (p=0,P=∅))]} = 1. Define Ai
.
= (1 − c)V Pi − V Ci (≥ 0) as the
functional surplus that the provider may appropriate should she decide to control





















Proposition 1 To determine the best design, the service provider sorts all touch-
points in the decreasing order of Ai, ∀i ∈ J . Let A[j] indicate the jth element
of this ordering. The optimal partitioning of the touchpoints must be of the form
P =
{
[1] , [2] , . . . , [j] |k ≤ j ≤ k̄
}
and C = J \P.
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Proposition 1 outlines an index policy for the touchpoint selection that can be
implemented by service providers. The prerequisites for the implementation are the
identification and the valuation of the journey touchpoints. The touchpoints can be
identified through empathic design techniques (Leonard and Rayport, 1997), whereas
their valuation follows marketing techniques like conjoint analysis (Green and Srini-
vasan, 1990). Ceteris paribus, the provider favors touchpoints that i) exhibit low
provision cost (low c), ii) offer high functional benefit V Pi , and/or iii) are challenging
for the customer (extremely low V Ci ).
Proposition 2 The service provider optimally chooses to control k∗ number of touch-
points and charge a price p∗, where:














> 0 ∀σ2P ∈ (σ2P , σ̄2P ).10
III. k∗ = n and p∗ = p̄(n) ∀σ2P ∈ (0, σ2P ].
If the variability of the subjective component is extremely high due to the na-
ture of the service task (i.e., σ2P ≥ σ̄2P ), then no profitable service can be offered.
On the other end, for small projected losses due to the variable experience (i.e., σ2P
takes values close to σ2P ), the customer always derives higher value from the provider
performing each touchpoint, and the provider controls the entire journey. For the
most interesting setting, a careful investigation of Case II reveals that even when
c = 0 (i.e., Ai = V
P
i −V Ci ) the optimal number of touchpoints k∗ can acquire interior
values, k∗ ∈ Zn\{0}. Thus, the provider foregoes controlling the entire customer
journey even when it is costless for her to do so. She does that to avoid the effects of
variable customer-provider interactions. Therefore, the decision regarding the extent
10Through bxc we indicate the greatest integer that does not exceed x.
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of customer-provider contact cannot follow solely cost or functional benefit considera-
tions. Practical validation for our result can be found in various service environments
where the providers offer self-service options (e.g., salad bars in menu-based restau-
rants) despite the fact that a self-service option may not present significant cost
advantages (e.g., the restaurant still employs a significant number of waiters). Figure
2 depicts the provider’s service design in the σ2P × ρ space when the entire customer
journey is costless. Next, we try to understand how the interdependencies between
(a) c = 0 (b) c = 0.2
Figure 2: Optimal number of touchpoints in the σ2P × ρ space for n = 12, r = 0.26,
V Pi = V
P = 2.28, V Ci = V
C = 1.6 and δ = 0.1. The “iso-touchpoint” curves are also
shown.
the service tasks (i.e., correlated experiences) affect the design decision. We restrict
our attention to moderate variability settings where σ2P ∈ (σ2P , σ̄2P ).
Proposition 3 The optimal number of steps k∗ is non-increasing in ρ, r, n and



















The provider benefits from limited control over the journey in settings with highly
interdependent tasks. Increased ρ implies that the non-linear effect of variability be-
comes more pronounced; potential bad experiences cascade throughout the entire
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customer journey. The provider accounts for it by limiting her control k∗. A similar
rationale applies when r increases, which is when customers become more averse to
experience fluctuations. In this case, even low levels of uncertainty σ2P drive higher
losses. The effects of the customer journey length (n), and the relative variability
between the self-service and the provider options (δ) are more involved (Figure 3).
We find that in lengthy customer journeys (i.e., numerous potential touchpoints) op-
timality results in fewer touchpoints. The is an indirect effect of the journey length
n on the boundaries of the interior solution region, i.e., (σ2P , σ̄
2
P ). As n increases σ
2
P
and σ̄2P decrease. This happens because the combined loss effect of the variability
and interdependencies is magnified. As n increases there are more steps over which
the negative experiences may propagate, making it harder to appropriate any benefit
even from fewer touchpoints. With respect to the relative variability in the idiosyn-
cratic experience component, the non-monotonic result rests again upon two drivers:
first, as δ increases the self-service option becomes less attractive (higher variability);
second, given the interdependencies, a higher δ increases the variability effects dis-
proportionally. As such the customer considers not entering the service system. The
only potential counter-action from the provider is to control more touchpoints in an
attempt to supply functional benefit (V Pi ) to the customer.
2.4.2 Service Design Under Information Asymmetry
In this section we analyze the design decisions of the provider in the presence of
asymmetric information. Recall, that the provider’s design decisions are interpreted
as signals m (θ) of her capability θ to deliver high service experiences. We should
emphasize here that the subsequent analysis does not assume a competitive setting
where both types of providers are present; instead, we consider a monopolistic setting,
where consumers do not know the type of the provider. In this context, the threat
is the fact that customers can attribute positive likelihood to the provider being a
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Figure 3: Optimal number of touchpoints in the ρ× δ space, for n = 16, r = 0.47,
V Pi = V
P = 8.5, V Ci = V
C = 3.67, c = 0.3 and σ2P = 1.3.
low capability one, when she is of high capability. From a technical standpoint, we
make the following conventions that allow much more tractability. First we assume
that the experience superiority of a capable provider is broken down as follows. The
functional benefit the customer may appropriate in each touchpoint is constant and
capability independent i.e., V θi = V
P
i , ∀i ∈ J and θ ∈ {H,L}. This assumption
allows us to keep the derivations sanely tractable. Still, customers derive an additional
overall experience V E benefit when the service is performed by the capable provider.
Given the assumed uniformity of the touchpoints, the set Pθ can be described by its
cardinality kθ (i.e., the number of touchpoints the θ-type provider chooses to control in
equilibrium).11 Second, in the analysis of the signaling game we use the real solution
k̄ as opposed to the integer rounding bk̄c (see Proposition 2).12
We study the formation of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) such that the cus-
tomers adopt pure strategies. We categorize these equilibria as separating and pooling
11This assumption is without loss of generality; our argument follows through even when Aθi 6= Aθj
∀i, j ∈ J , i.e., the touchpoint parameters differ and are capability dependent. We offer details in
the Appendix.
12We further discuss this assumption in the Appendix.
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(Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Stock and Balachander, 2005). In a separating equilib-
rium, the high-type provider adopts strategies that ensure she cannot be confused
with a low-type provider (technically, a low-type provider cannot beneficially mimick
those strategies); thus, she successfully signals her capability advantage. In a pooling
equilibrium, actions end up being uninformative and customers cannot in equilibrium
distinguish between a high and low-type provider. In order to refine the plethora of
the resulting equilibria, a characteristic of signaling games, we employ the intuitive
criterion, as established by Cho and Kreps (1987).
2.4.2.1 Separating Equilibrium.
First, we analyze the existence and structure of the separating equilibria. In a sepa-
rating equilibrium, the high-type provider adopts a service design that in equilibrium
will lead customers to update their prior to the posterior φ′ = 1.
Proposition 4 The high capability service provider can most profitably signal her
type by adjusting the number of the touchpoints she controls kH and charging pH =
p̄(kH).
Proposition 4 reveals the relative importance among the two design decisions.
It is more beneficial for a provider to signal her type through an informative set of
touchpoints as opposed to the price. Then, service price p is adjusted to the maximum
value p̄(k) as defined in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
In order for the high-type provider to successfully signal her capability, she needs
to make sure that her design could not be credibly mimicked by a potential low-type








design would be a loss-making proposition for a
low-type provider compared to the design that would reveal her low type. At the same
time, though, a high-type provider should find it profitable to seek separation and
not to take an action off the equilibrium path and be perceived as a low-type provider
by the customer. In the Appendix we provide the necessary technical conditions for
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the existence of such a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 5 There exists a positive threshold value V̂ E such that for all V E ≤ V̂ E
a high-type provider can signal her capability by simply offering her full information
optimal design, i.e., she controls k̄(H) touchpoints. The price that the high-type




+V E. The threshold V̂ E is defined
as follows:









II. When cH > cL, and cH−cL >
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
V P








0. In any other case the provider cannot signal her expertise through a full in-
formation design choice.
Proposition 5 identifies the most favorable situation for a high-type provider.
Under the conditions listed, the customers can extrapolate that a low-type provider
would be reluctant to mimick even the full information design choices of the high-type
provider. Thus, the high-type provider can successfully signal her type through her
full information strategy. Intuitively, the reluctance from a low-type provider arises
from the fact that the optimal number of touchpoints k∗ (θ) decreases in cθ. In Case
I, due to the lower costs associated with the provision of a touchpoint, the low-type
provider could not have tried to implement k∗(H) unless the premium experience
V E exceeds a threshold V̂ E (see Figure 4). Interestingly, if high experiences are
associated with the quality of the service outcome (which can be delivered through
higher provision costs, i.e., cH > cL) as in Case II, then the capable provider can
meaningfully signal her type only when her provision cost is large enough, i.e., only
when she is an expensive enough expert such as the best specialist doctor. The
rationale comes from the fact that a high-type provider can profitably decrease the
number of touchpoints she controls and avoid being mimicked only for a significantly
higher cost cH . Under that scenario, a potential low-type provider would not choose
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in equilibrium to decrease her number of touchpoints. Instead of chasing the relatively
small experience premium V E, she would stick to her full information optimal design
lured by her significantly lower cost cL.
Proposition 6 describes the cases in which a low-type provider has a stronger
incentive to mimick the high-type provider’s equilibrium actions because of the sig-
nificant experience premium V E. In these circumstances, a high-type service provider
would adopt a “costly” action and depart from her full information optimal design
to signal her capability.
Proposition 6 For values V E > V̂ E, separation becomes costly for the high-type
provider. The following statements characterize the separating equilibrium that satis-
fies the intuitive criterion.
I. If cH < cL, then k
H = k̄s(V
E) ≥ k∗(H) ∀V E ∈
(
V̂ E, V̂ En
)
.
II. If cH > cL, then k
H = ks(V
E) ≤ k∗(H) ∀V E ∈
(
V̂ E, V̂ E0
)
.












































(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4







































(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 4: The most favorable (least costly) separation action for a high-type service
provider. Type can be successfully signaled through the full information design ∀V E ∈[
0, V̂ E
]
for n = 20, r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16 and ρ = 0.46.
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When V E > V̂ E, it is credible in the “eyes” of the customer that a low-type provider
profitably mimicks a wider set of high-type action. Depending on the service objec-
tive a high-type provider can react to such a threat through two distinctly different
service designs. First, when high experiences are associated with streamlined and
cost-efficient task completion (cH < cL), a high-type provider chooses to offer an ex-
tended number of touchpoints, i.e., she controls more touchpoints than under a full
information benchmark case (Figure 5). Such an offering becomes a rather costly
action for a low-type provider to mimick, who would never undertake it and instead
would employ her full information optimal design k̄(L). A service design with more
touchpoints allows the capable provider to signal her ability to offer a cost-efficient
service process. Conversely, if high experiences are associated with the quality level of
a costly (expertise-based) service outcome (i.e., cH > cL), then the capable provider
introduces a design with fewer touchpoints than the full information design. In this
way, she signals her costly expertise to perform the service. The result of Proposition
6 points to a very important managerial implication. New services are often subject
to uncertainty regarding the ability of the provider to claim a high experience capa-
bility. In such cases, a service provider needs to identify upfront the service objective
in order to lay out an informative design. As seen in Figure 5, once V E exceeds
a certain threshold the high-type provider can no longer follow the equilibrium ac-
tions prescribed by Proposition 6. The main reason is that, for such high experience
premium realized by the consumers, a low-type provider has a very strong incentive
to mimick the high-type designs. As a response, a high-type provider implements
extreme design configurations (i.e., kH = 0 or kH = n). Proposition 7 prescribes the
new set of actions.
Proposition 7 Under the following conditions, the high-type provider cannot signal
her type only through the design configuration.
I. If cH < cL and V
E ≥ V̂ En , then a separating equilibrium can be reached only if
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(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4















































(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 5: Signaling process efficiency through the control of more touchpoints (on
the left) and expertise based outcome through the control of fewer touchpoints (on
the right) when V E > V̂ E and n = 20, r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31,
δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46.









P − V E < p̄ (n).
II. If cH > cL and V
E ≥ V̂ E0 , no separating equilibrium exists.
In the case of streamlined processes (cH < cL) a capable provider could potentially
satisfy the separation conditions and avoid being mimicked only if kH > n. Clearly,
such a design is infeasible. However, Proposition 7 offers an alternative lever to
signal capability: the price pH . A high-type provider can still reap benefits through
the costly action of offering a lower price that a potential low-type provider cannot
mimick. In expertise-based services the high-type provider is cut out of the market.
She cannot credibly signal her type and consumers in equilibrium are not able to tell
whether she is of high capability. In that regard, expertise can be signalled through
a focused service design up to a limit. Beyond that limit, customers can no longer
infer the the provider’s capability and they act based on their prior belief.
2.4.2.2 Pooling Equilibrium.
Pooling equilibria identify settings in which a high capability provider finds it prof-
itable to choose an action that does not reveal her type. In order for such an action
to be an equilibrium action, it shall be that a low type provider has an incentive to
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imitate it in equilibrium. In this case the customers’ posterior belief φ′ remains the
same as prior one φ. In the Appendix we outline the technical conditions for the
existence of such uninformative equilibria.
Proposition 8 A pooling equilibrium exists ∀φ ∈ (0, 1) as long as V E ≥ V̂ E(φ).
At equilibrium, the service provider controls kP = k̄(H) touchpoints and charges the





Proposition 8 reveals that, for a pooling strategy to be an equilibrium strategy,
the customers’ experience premium needs to exceed a certain threshold. Otherwise,
customers would not find it credible that a low-type provider would have an incentive
to pool. We show in Figure 6 that a pooling equilibrium exists even when the cus-
tomers maintain an a priori pessimistic view (φ = 0.35 < 0.5) about the provider’s
capability to offer a high experience. In a pooling equilibrium the service design of-
fered assumes the same touchpoints as in the design of a capable provider under full
information kP = k̄(H).


































(a) φ = 0.1


































(b) φ = 0.35
Figure 6: Pooling parabola and the existence of a pooling equilibrium when n = 20,
r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46, cH = 0.3, cL = 0.4.
13We can identify cases in which the intuitive criterion fails to further refine the multitude of
pooling equilibria. For tractability reasons, we assume that if a pooling equilibrium is formed this
will happen where the high type provider can realize the highest payoff. Such equilibrium can also be
characterized as focal equilibrium.
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Corollary 1 In the presence of information asymmetry, the high-type provider would
optimally design the service offering as follows:




, then the provider employs the “full-information” service de-
sign.
II. If V E ∈
(




V̂ E, V̂ E0
]
) and φ ≥ φ̄ (φ ≥ φ̌), then the provider
chooses an “uninformative” service design, that is, she chooses a pooling strat-
egy. Otherwise, she employs a separating strategy to signal cost efficient (costly
expertise) capability.
III. If V E > V̂ En (V
E > V̂ E0 ) then the provider chooses a pooling strategy unless
φ < φ̃ which allows her to signal cost efficiency through the pricing.
Corollary 1 offers a complete action “map” for the separation or pooling design choices
of a high-type provider. We outline conditions that render separation or pooling a
beneficial strategy. A pooling strategy is associated with a high enough level of prior
belief regarding the provider capability, and a high enough level of the experience
premium enjoyed by the customer. We describe the optimal service designs given
the level of information asymmetry (φ) and the premium V E for different service
objectives (Figure 7).
2.5 Discussion and Directions for Future Research
In this paper, we analyze the design challenges that a service provider faces when
introducing an experiential service. We build upon the customer journey, a well-
grounded representation of a service process, to formalize the service offering as a
sequence of distinct steps. At each such touchpoint, a customer forms an experi-
ence about the service, which results from both the functional benefit recouped, and
the interaction driven component of the service. The overall customer experience
is the accumulation of the touchpoint experiences. High experiences depend on the
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(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4
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(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 7: Optimal signaling strategies of the high-type service provider when n = 20,
r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46.
objective of a service. For example, customers may associate high experiences with
a streamlined service completion, or with the quality of the service outcome. More-
over, in new services, the customer rarely knows with certainty whether the provider
is capable of offering a high experience service. A monopolist provider determines
her service design through two decisions: the journey touchpoints that she chooses
to control, and the price that she charges for the service. We show that service
designers may benefit from estimating and understanding the effects of distinct ser-
vice task parameters: the variability in the experience outcomes realized during the
customer-provider interactions, the interdependencies between the tasks performed
at the different service touchpoints, and the association between high experience out-
comes and the service objective. The insights of our model can be summarized as
follows:
• Which steps of the customer journey should be controlled? We identify
a simple and feasible-to-implement decision rule. The provider orders all the
touchpoints in decreasing value of the functional surplus associated with each
touchpoint. Then she chooses to control the highest k∗ of them, such that the
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k∗-th touchpoint balances the functional surplus with the interaction driven
experience losses. Our rule is practically appealing because, it relies on existing
firm practices: i) the identification of the customer journey (a task that design
firms have mastered), and ii) the use of traditional valuation parameters such as
the cost c, and the functional benefits V Pi , and V
C
i , which conjoint techniques
in marketing have long analyzed.
• How much of the service process should be “delegated” to the cus-
tomer? When the interaction component of the experience outcome is moder-
ately variable, the optimal number of service touchpoints lies between 0 and n,
even when c = 0. Thus, the best design configuration cannot be based solely
on cost considerations. Instead, indirect “costs” that relate to the interactions
between the service provider and the customer may prove significant parameters
that determine a service design.
• Can service design signal capability and how? Service designs need to
account for information asymmetry between the customer and the provider,
as they can signal the capability of the provider to offer high experience out-
comes. The design implications are not uniform across all settings; instead,
they are contingent on the service features that the consumer values in the
particular type of service. When a customer associates high experiences with
a streamlined, cost-efficient process completion the service design can mitigate
information asymmetry through the control of a larger proportion of the cus-
tomer journey. This signals the ability of the capable provider to efficiently offer
and handle more touchpoint interactions with the customer. Instead, when high
experiences stem from a costly, expertise-based quality of the service outcome,
the provider can benefit by focusing the interaction on the touchpoints that
convey her expertise.
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The aforementioned insights are based on several assumptions we made during
the formulation and analysis of our model. The relaxation of some of these assump-
tions can offer great future research avenues. Allowing a more dynamic interaction
between the provider and the customer, such as the one that may happen when a
customer abandons the service process, may potentially change the dynamics of the
relationship and the subsequent design implications. For instance, the provider may
exert additional effort on specific steps in order to “lure” the customer to stay en-
gaged and commit to a price, or she may reconsider the “location” of the price (i.e.,
the touchpoint where the customer commits to a price). As an example, consider
the practices of providers like Starbucks and Barnes & Noble who invest in costly
touchpoints such as the provision of a pleasant lounge area or a comfortable study
environment without obliging the consumer to commit to a transaction (e.g., buy a
drink or a book, respectively). Moreover, our analysis can be further enriched by
accounting for specific behavioral traits such as memory recency effects (Chase and
Dasu, 2001; Bitran et al., 2008; Aflaki and Popescu, 2010).
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CHAPTER III
TO SELL AND TO PROVIDE?
THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE AUTO MANUFACTURER’S
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CAR SHARING BUSINESS
3.1 Introduction
Transportation serves an indispensable role in the economy as well as our personal
lives, yet it poses a worldwide threat owing to the greenhouse gas (GHG) missions.
Along with increasing global usage of transportation there has been an unsettling
surge in GHG emissions. In 2006, the transportation sector accounted for 29% of
the total U.S. GHG emissions, realizing a 27% increase from 1990 (U.S. EPA, 2010).
Light-duty vehicles accounted for 59% of the total transportation emissions, a 24%
increase compared to 1990. This worrisome trend, along with the mandates of the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, have spurred policymakers to devise
strategies that can reduce transportation emissions (U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, 2010).
In accordance with these efforts, researchers have highlighted the potential role of
services as a remedy for the environmental burden caused by human activity (Rothen-
berg, 2007). Specifically, it has been argued that services can contribute to the “de-
materialization” of the economy, which effectively means a reduction in the materials
intensity of economic activity (Heiskanen and Jalas, 2000). Along those lines, in re-
cent years manufacturers from various industries have begun to orient their practices
towards providing solutions (e.g., mobility, lighting, carpeting) as opposed to strictly
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selling their products. This trend, known as servicization, reveals the transition
from a product ownership economy to a functional or service economy. Servicization
is characterized by the emergence of product-based services, also known as Product-
Service-Systems (Mont, 2002), which blur the distinction between manufacturing and
traditional service activities. Product-Service-Systems (PSS) are business models that
extend the traditional functionality of a product by incorporating additional services
(Baines et al., 2007). The customer value is linked directly to the “use” rather than
the “ownership” of the product. Rolls-Royce’s “power by the hour,” DuPont’s car
painting program, and Xerox’s document management solutions are examples of suc-
cessful PSS (for more examples see White et al., 1999 and Mont, 2004).
In the transportation business and especially in the automotive sector, serviciza-
tion began with the emergence of car sharing (membership-based) programs. The
providers of these programs maintain the control of the assets, which frees the cus-
tomers from the administrative hassles associated with vehicle ownership. After pay-
ing a yearly fee, customers become members of the car sharing program and have
access to a large fleet of vehicles. Via internet or telephone, members are able to
check vehicle availability and reserve a car in increments as short as one hour and
pay only for the time they reserve. Gas, maintenance, and insurance are included
in the hourly price. In this manner, car sharing transforms the fixed-costs associ-
ated with the ownership of a vehicle (i.e., purchase cost, depreciation, insurance) to
variable costs (i.e., usage-related costs).
Zipcar, founded in 1999 and merged with Flexcar in 2008, is the largest for-profit
car sharing provider in the U.S. Other major vehicle rental companies like Enter-
prise Rent-A-Car Co., Hertz Corp., and Avis Budget recently entered the car sharing
business (Everson, 2008). Frost & Sullivan (2010) estimates that by 2016 the market
in North America will be worth $3.31B in revenues and will comprise 4.41M mem-
bers. Interestingly, despite the increasing popularity of car sharing and the promising
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projections of growth, auto manufacturers have been reluctant to engage is such busi-
ness. Only recently has BMW announced their intention to expand the scope of their
business by introducing car membership schemes (Fuhrmans, 2010), and Daimler AG
operates a car sharing program in only four major cities in the U.S. (CAR2GO, 2011).
This hesitation may be attributed to fears of demand cannibalization.
Offering products under membership-based schemes has the potential to attract
customers who otherwise would purchase the respective asset (Cervero et al., 2007;
Cervero and Tsai, 2004; Lane, 2005). In the ownership (or leasing)1 case, each con-
sumer is tied to at least one product that he will use to fulfill his mobility needs.
However, by entering car sharing programs, customers can derive the same value by
using fewer products in total. This phenomenon stems from the fact that the same
product can be used by many consumers in different periods of time, resulting in more
efficient overall use and less production volume. Additionally, car sharing forces a di-
rect consideration of the driving cost. Making the cost of driving more immediate can
compel customers to adopt more efficient driving patterns or even drive less (i.e., the
taxi-meter effect, Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency has categorized car sharing as a top-ten, high-potential, “green-servicizing”
business model (U.S. EPA, 2009). Zipcar also claims that every shared car replaces
over 15 privately-owned vehicles and that their members drive 5,500 miles or less per
year (Zipcar, 2012c); however, such environmental claims have yet to be analytically
proven.
The environmental implications of membership programs are still not completely
1A number of studies (Hawken et al., 2010; Lifset and Lindhqvist, 1999; Fishbein et al., 2000;
Agrawal et al., 2012) have assessed the “green” potential of leasing as a business practice. The
main question of these studies is whether the manufacturers can (or will) efficiently remarket the
used products and extend the effective life of the product. Membership schemes clearly extend the
product stewardship idea, which is built in the leasing concept and is used as the main environmental
argument by its proponents. However, in our context leasing differs from car sharing in two important
aspects that have not been factored in other studies. First, payment is directly linked to vehicle use,
which may potentially affect customers’ driving patterns, and second, vehicle production volume
may be smaller due to pooling effects.
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clear. Membership business can potentially expand the customer base towards seg-
ments that previously were inactive. For instance, a car sharing scheme may appear
to be attractive to commuters who normally use public transportation modes to cover
their mobility needs. In this way, the production volume may increase while the ef-
ficiency in use decreases, since the per-user energy consumption or GHG emissions
increase. Furthermore, because of the lack of considerable fixed costs, it is possible
that customers who previously could afford to purchase a vehicle but then choose to
join a car sharing program decide to drive more, thereby increasing the use-related
emissions. Therefore, the assessment of the environmental dimension of car sharing
schemes is not a trivial subject.
The novelty and increasing popularity of the car sharing programs, along with the
the auto manufacturers’ hesitation to invest in such programs, motivate us to further
explore car sharing business models. In this paper, we study the auto manufacturer’s
choice regarding whether to provide mobility service (e.g., car sharing) in conjunction
with the traditional sales channel. We outline the consumer’s choice between pur-
chasing a vehicle, benefiting from the mobility service, or relying on an outside option
(e.g., public transportation), and we calculate the effect of each choice on customer’s
driving pattern (vehicle usage). We identify the conditions under which the auto
manufacturer is better off by becoming involved in car sharing. Despite the fact that
car sharing has been widely perceived or marketed as an environmentally beneficial
business model, we demonstrate that the proliferation of car sharing may actually
increase the environmental burden.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In §3.2 we provide a brief
review of the literature related to our research. We introduce our assumptions and the
basic model in §3.3, while in §3.4 we interpret the optimal decisions of the customers
and the manufacturer. In §3.5 we discuss the insights obtained from our results and
conclude with directions for future extensions. All proofs and technical details are
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provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Literature
Our work builds on and contributes to three streams of literature. The first stream
comprises studies that aim to support and explain the potential environmental ben-
efits of solution-oriented (servicized) business models. The second stream analyzes
pay-per-use schemes, which are typically implemented for information goods and ac-
cess services. In the third stream, a number of studies empirically identify the main
factors that drive consumer demand for car sharing schemes. In the following para-
graphs, we provide a brief overview of each of the above research streams, with the
objective of positioning our work in the context of the existing literature rather than
providing an exhaustive review.
Since its conception, the idea of a functional economy (Stahel, 1994), in which
the focus of consumption is not on the products per se but on the services which
those products deliver, has been associated with the concept of sustainable devel-
opment (White et al., 1999). Apart from that association, the literature has also
advocated the contribution of functional business models to profitability. It has been
proposed that, by focusing on the integrated final customer needs and delivering in-
tegrated solutions fulfilling these needs, companies would be able to improve their
position in the value chain, enhance the value of their offering, and improve their
innovation potential (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Sawhney et al., 2003). The con-
cept of Product-Service-Systems has emerged as the natural aftermath of the above
stream and has been positioned at the forefront of sustainable development within the
framework of a functional economy (Goedkoop, 1999). The definition of PSS varies
throughout the literature. However, most authors agree that there exist three differ-
ent PSS types (U.S. EPA, 2009): i) product-oriented PSS in which a manufacturer, in
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addition to selling a product, includes extra services (e.g., after-sales service), ii) use-
oriented PSS in which the manufacturer maintains ownership of the product and sells
the use or availability of it, and iii) result-oriented PSS in which the manufacturer
and the customer agree on a certain result or performance level.
Although identifying an exhaustive typology of PSS is out of the scope of this
paper, the above categorization helps us to gain more insight into the thus far vague
definition of PSS. Car sharing business models constitute a use-oriented PSS. In their
survey paper, Baines et al. (2007) conclude that the literature lacks the analytical rigor
necessary for evaluating the environmental and economical dimensions of PSS. They
openly call for more quantitative methods, which can help organizations understand
the perceived value that potential customers may hold and evaluate the required
level of service. Towards this direction, Toffel (2002) discusses the agency problems
that arise in such servicized business models, while Kim et al. (2007) and Guajardo
et al. (2011) study the implications of performance-based contracting on supply chain
relationships and product reliability, respectively. Closer in spirit to our work is
the paper of Avci et al. (2012), which studies the adoption and the environmental
implications resulting from such adoption of electric vehicles that are offered under a
pay-per-use scheme and which can utilize battery switching stations. Their approach,
however, does not capture the interplay of production and pricing decisions related to
offering vehicles via selling and/or pay-per-use schemes. In this paper we adopt such a
holistic approach by incorporating the manufacturer’s perspective. Consequently, we
contribute to the growing stream of research that rigorously approaches “servicized”
business models, and we jointly assess their environmental as well as economical
performance.
Previous research has been prolific in the study of nonlinear pricing schemes for
information goods and access services. Like car sharing, business models involv-
ing information goods or access services are characterized by two properties: i) no
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ownership rights are transferred to the customer and ii) payment is tightly linked to
customer use. Varian (2000) proves that sharing can increase the manufacturer’s prof-
its when the transactions costs of sharing incurred by customers are smaller than the
marginal production cost. Furthermore, when customers have heterogeneous tastes,
then the wealthier customers buy and the rest choose to rent. These findings are
generalized by Sundararajan (2004) who derives the conditions under which, in the
presence of transaction costs, selling and pay-per use schemes should be combined by
a monopolist. Balasubramanian et al. (2011) extend this line of work by introducing
customer heterogeneity with respect to the frequency of use and the utility per use
both in monopolistic and competitive settings. Then, similar to our approach, they
study the manufacturer’s decision to sell and/or offer pay-per-use. Essegaier et al.
(2002) investigate the combined effect of customer usage heterogeneity and capacity
constraints on the firm’s pricing decisions. They find that when capacity is a limiting
factor, the customer mix that the firm admits becomes of strategic importance. In
this case, the fixed fee is negatively correlated with the usage based fee. On the other
hand, when capacity is ample the firm offers unlimited access (i.e., the firm charges
only a flat fee). Our work is differentiated with respect to this stream of literature in
several important dimensions. Specifically, in our model i) the manufacturer incurs a
significant production cost (such cost is typically assumed to be zero in the informa-
tion goods literature; cf., Jones and Mendelson, 2011), ii) under sharing an increase in
the usage of a vehicle inflicts a proportional operating cost on the manufacturer, and
iii) customers determine the optimal usage according to their budgetary constraints.
Therefore, in our setting the manufacturer’s production and pricing decisions can-
not be deduced from the insights offered by the existing literature. For instance, by
offering car sharing the manufacturer can take advantage of the pooling effect and
decrease the total production cost, forfeiting at the same time a higher profit mar-
gin. The manufacturer can try to recoup this loss by increasing the usage related fee
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which, however, will affect the appeal of car sharing because customers will be forced
to drive less.
Despite the fact that car sharing represents a relatively recent innovation in
transportation, the increasing popularity of membership schemes has already mo-
tivated researchers to investigate the drivers that shape consumer demand for such
schemes. The literature has focused on many aspects of car sharing. Prettenthaler
and Steininger (1999) use the “total distance” that customers need to travel, the
“availability” of the vehicles and “prestige” (i.e., endowment effect, Hanemann, 1991;
Shogren et al., 1994) as the most important indicators suggestive of car sharing
adoption. Steininger et al. (1996) also suggest the “environmental soundness” of
a transportation mode as a determinant of customer adoption. Researchers have also
studied the market for car sharing, such as conducting detailed demographic analyses
of those who have chosen to join a car sharing service (Burkhardt and Millard-Ball,
2006). Some of the characteristics commonly found among the adopters of car sharing
include (Millard-Ball et al., 2005): urban residence, low vehicle ownership, environ-
mental consciousness, propensity to be an “early-adopter,” membership in a small
household, high educational background and an age between the 30s and 40s.
The changes in driving patterns after joining car sharing programs have also been
the topic of extensive research. After surveying all car sharing members in Austria,
Steininger et al. (1996) found that the change in vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) was
due to a change in the total distance driven and not the frequency of vehicle use.
Specifically, for households that owned a car before joining the membership scheme,
the share of trips done via a car for trips of more than 20 km declined significantly.
The authors attribute this difference to the fact that cost transparency reveals the
advantage of public transportation. On the other hand, Cervero (2003) observes that
some car sharing members who previously did not own a car actually increased their
VMT. However, the fact that a car sharing membership might deter a future vehicle
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purchase should be considered in measuring aggregate VMT impacts. Finally, Sha-
heen et al. (2004) highlight that despite the increasing interest in car sharing, the
efforts of car sharing organizations to evaluate membership impact on travel behavior
have been inadequate to characterize long-term effects. Along similar lines, Duncan
(2010) calls for research that directly models car sharing adoption. Our paper builds
on the observations made by this stream of literature and clearly responds to the call
for more elaborate and explicit modeling of the consumer decision making. Through
our analysis, we calculate how certain customer characteristics affect the manufac-
turer’s production and pricing decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt that adopts the auto manufacturer s perspective and develops a holistic
view of the selling and membership business models flourishing in the transportation
business.
3.3 The Model
In the “business-as-usual” setting the auto manufacturer offers only the option of
Ownership to the customers (i.e., the manufacturer sells vehicles). The manufac-
turer’s decisions involve the determination of the selling price F .2 For a given time
period the selling price F maps directly to an amortized cost of ownership FO. In
our setting the auto manufacturer evaluates the prospect of offering Membership (i.e.,
becoming involved in the car sharing business) in conjunction with Ownership. Under
car sharing each customer is no longer tied to one car, so the manufacturer has to
determine the appropriate number of vehicles S that the car sharing fleet will com-
prise. The size of the fleet directly affects the probability with which customers find
2The study of possible supply chain coordination issues is out of the scope of this paper. Our
work is rather focused on the market conditions under which it would be profitable for the auto
manufacturer to become involved in the car sharing business. In the absence of such conditions, the
study of supply channel coordination becomes futile. Therefore, in the rest of this paper we choose
to ignore the existence of intermediaries (e.g., car dealers).
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a vehicle available. Therefore, the manufacturer needs to choose an S that guaran-
tees a minimum service level ā ∈ (0, 1), which in the rest of the paper we assume
to be industry set. The manufacturer also determines the period (e.g., yearly) fixed
membership fee FM and the per unit of usage fee pM . Introducing Membership in
conjunction with Ownership has the potential to i) expand the manufacturer’s mar-
ket and attract customers who resorted to alternative modes of transportation (e.g.,
public transportation) and/or ii) cannibalize on existing vehicle sales. Therefore, the
auto manufacturer cannot treat F , S, FM , and pM as independent decisions. Figure
8(a) provides a schematic representation of the manufacturer’s perspective.
Customers choose a transportation mode j ∈ {O,M, ∅} in which O stands for
Ownership, M for Membership, and ∅ indicates the case in which customers are cut
off from the market; that is, they do not cover their transportation needs by Ownership
or Membership but rather rely on an outside option such as public transportation.
Without loss of generality, in the rest of the analysis we normalize the costs associated
with the ∅ mode to zero. For any j ∈ {O,M}, a customer incurs a period (e.g.,
yearly) fixed fee Fj, a per unit of usage fee pj, and a per unit of usage opportunity
cost pa(≥ pj) when the vehicle is not available. In the case of ownership, the per
unit of usage fee pO equals the exogenously determined gasoline cost. The cost pa
reflects the quality of the alternative modes to which customers resort when the
vehicle is not available. For instance, customers who live in cities with an expanded
and reliable transportation system incur lower pa. We assume that under Ownership a
vehicle will be practically always available, while under Membership, the unavailability
(probability of shortage) of the vehicle depends on the size S of the fleet, as we
have already described. Therefore, from a customer’s perspective, the Ownership
transportation mode can be fully characterized by the vector O = (FO, pO, 1) and the
Membership mode by the vector M = (FM , pM , ā).
After observing O and M, the customer compares his budget y with the the cost
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CO of covering his mobility needs through Ownership and the cost CM of covering his
mobility needs through Membership. Then, for the modes he can afford, he calculates
the corresponding utilities Ūj and chooses the mode that results in the highest utility.
If the customer chooses the transportation mode j, then qj indicates the total time
that he decides to use a vehicle for a given time period (e.g., one year). We define
usage qj as the total amount of time a customer needs to keep the vehicle “off-base”
(e.g., in a home garage or car sharing parking lot) in order to fulfill his objective (e.g.,
attend a business meeting or run errands). This time may include both actual driving
and idle time. Through qj customers must be able to meet their minimum driving
requirements d. Ceteris paribus customers prefer higher qj. To avoid unrealistic
cases, we introduce d̄ to indicate the total amount of time for a given time period






















(b) The customer’s perspective
Figure 8: The manufacturer’s and customer’s perspective. If the auto manufacturer
introduces Membership, then she needs to calculate F , FM , pM , and S that can bal-
ance the benefit of potential market expansion with the risk of sales cannibalization.
The customer first chooses a transportation mode and then, given this choice, decides
on the vehicle usage.
In the following sections we formulate the customer’s as well as the manufacturer’s
problems by applying backwards induction on the sequence of events delineated in




We consider two homogeneous customer segments based on their transportation
needs, H and L (high and low), with sizes nH and nL and transportation budgets
yH and yL, respectively. In this context we use the subscript i ∈ {H,L} to indicate
a customer segment rather than an individual customer. For a given transportation
mode j ∈ {O,M}, each customer of the i segment maximizes:
max
qij
Ūij = yi + Uij(qij)− Cj(qij) (5)
s.t qij ≥ d (6)
yi ≥ Cj(qij) (7)











Cj(qij) = Fj +
(
pj + (pa − pj) aj
)
ωjqij. (9)
For similar utility and cost structures refer to Sriram et al. (2011) and Lambrecht
et al. (2007).
We use b to indicate the demand slope measuring the change in usage per unit
change in price, d̄ to represent the baseline usage of mode j when pj = 0, and
Figure 9: Sequence of events.
44
γj the customers’ intrinsic preference to use mode j (e.g., endowment effect in the
case of ownership and environmental consciousness in the case of membership). The
parameter ωj indicates the portion of the total usage time qij that actual driving
occurs. Through ωj we capture the fact that under Ownership the driver incurs a cost
that stems only from the actual driving time. Conversely, a driver under Membership
incurs a cost proportional to the total time elapsed between leaving and returning
to the point of origin. Therefore, ωO
.
= ω ∈ (0, 1) and ωM = 1. The parameter
aj ∈ (0, 1) captures the availability of a vehicle offered through the j transportation
mode. Without loss of generality we assume that under Ownership, aO = 1 and for
notational parsimony we define aM
.
= a = 1− ā.
Constraint (6) ensures that the resulting optimal usage will meet customers’ min-
imum driving needs. The ability of segment i to “participate” in the transportation
mode j is ensured through constraint (7). Namely, if (7) holds, then the customers
of segment i will be able to afford the use of a vehicle under the mode j for their
optimal q∗ij amount of time. If no j ∈ {O,M} can satisfy the constraints (6)&(7),
then customers resort to their outside option ∅ (e.g., public transportation).
Lemma 1 The customers of the i ∈ {H,L} segment will consider choosing the trans-
portation mode j ∈ {O,M} if and only Fj ≤ yi −
(





The necessary condition for the customers of segment i to choose transportation mode
j is that the per period fixed fee Fj for mode j does not exceed the threshold F̄ij. It
is easy to see that the threshold F̄ij is increasing in the budget yi and decreasing in
pj, pa, aj, ωj and d. For instance, if a customer’s driving pattern involves high driv-
ing requirements (d), then this also implies higher driving (use-related) cost. The
customer will be able to afford to drive at least d, if and only if Fj is set such that
his budget is not exceeded. We should note that Lemma 2 does not guarantee the
selection of the j mode from the i segment. It rather defines the prerequisite (individ-
ual rationality) that needs to be met for customers to consider j as a transportation
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option. In the case that a segment can afford participation in both transportation
modes, then the choice of the mode will be based solely on the comparison of ŪiO and
ŪiM (incentive compatibility).3
The transportation choices of the high and low segments before a possible in-
troduction of Membership as a transportation mode can be described by (Owner-
ship, Ownership), (Ownership,∅), or (∅, ∅). After the introduction of Membership,
the manufacturer can lure the high and low segments towards the following seven
market configurations: (Ownership, Ownership), (Ownership, Membership), (Mem-
bership, Membership), (Membership, Ownership), (Ownership, ∅), (Membership, ∅)
and (∅, ∅). For each one of these cases to materialize the corresponding individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constrains need to hold. For instance, after
the introduction of Membership the High segment chooses Ownership and the Low
segment chooses Membership (i.e., the case of (Ownership, Membership) materializes)
if and only if constraints (10)-(13) are satisfied.
FO ≤ F̄HO = yH − ωpOd (10)
FM ≤ F̄LM = yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (11)
Ū∗HO ≥ Ū∗HM (12)
Ū∗LM ≥ 1FO≤F̄LO Ū
∗
LO (13)
Constraints (10)-(11) and constraints (12)-(13) indicate the individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints of the high and low segments towards Owner-
ship and Membership, respectively. If the customers of the low segment cannot afford
the Ownership transportation mode, then the constraint (13) is reduced to Ū∗LM ≥ 0
(i.e., the indicator function 1FO≤F̄LO = 0 if FO > F̄LO; otherwise 1FO≤F̄LO = 1). Fig-
ure 10(c) depicts constraints (10)-(13) in the FO × FM × pM space for a given set of
parameters. To enhance manuscript readability we exhibit the individual rationality
3If both ŪiO, ŪiM < 0 then customers choose ∅, i.e., the outside option.
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and incentive compatibility constraints for the rest of the six market configurations
in the Appendix.
In Figures 11(a)-11(i) we show the materialization of the aforementioned market
configurations in the FM × pM space for various values of d and ω. Specifically, we
see that for low values of pM , both segments benefit from the structure of the fixed
costs (FM < FO) and therefore tend to self-select to Membership. However, this
benefit becomes weaker as pM increases. Also, as the minimum driving requirement
d increases, Ownership (and eventually ∅) tends to prevail over Membership. The
reason is that increasing d makes the effect of pM more pronounced, since under
Membership customers incur an operating cost for the entire d (active driving and
idle time). Reasonably, Ownership becomes less attractive to the customers as ω
increases. Higher values of ω imply that d comprises higher active driving time.
Therefore, besides the higher fixed cost (FO > FM), customers who choose Ownership
also incur higher operating cost; hence, they prefer to “migrate” to Membership.
The manufacturer needs to identify the most profitable scenario. Therefore, she
proceeds by evaluating and comparing the profitability of all seven market configura-
tions. In what follows, we construct the manufacturer’s profit function.
3.3.2 The Manufacturer’s Problem
As shown in equation (14) the calculation of the profit generated from the selling
of vehicles to the i segment is straightforward. It involves the selling price F of the
vehicles, the marginal production cost c, and the size ni of the segment i.
ΠOi = (F − c)ni. (14)
If the useful life of a vehicle is D time periods and the resale value of it after D
is R = hc, with h ∈ (0, 1), then assuming straight line depreciation the selling price
F can be expressed as F = DFO + hc, where FO is the period fixed cost of vehicle
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Figure 10: Conditions for the self-selection of segments (H,L) towards Ownership
(O), Membership (M), or Outside Option (∅) in the FO × FM × pM space (each
combination is indicated below the figures). The parameters used are a = 0.05,
pa = 21, pO = 3.5, yH = 8000, yL = 4000, d̄ = 285, ω = 0.5, d = 190, b = 1, and
γO = γM = 0.
ownership that customers incur. Therefore, we can restate equation (14) as follows:
ΠOi = (DFO − (1− h)c)ni. (15)
The manufacturer faces a more involved reward and cost structure when she op-
erates a car sharing scheme. Specifically, over the useful lifetime D of the vehicles
the manufacturer appropriates two streams of revenue. The first stream is generated
by the period-fixed subscriptions while the second stream stems from the usage of
the vehicles. In this case, however, the manufacturer in addition to the production
cost also incurs the operating (i.e., fuel) cost of the vehicles. Regarding the total
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(i) ω = 0.1, d = 2280.
Figure 11: Conditions for the self-selection of segments (H,L) towards Ownership
(O), Membership (M), or Outside Option (∅) in the FM × pM space. The parameters
used are a = 0.05, pa = 21, pO = 3.5, yH = 8000, yL = 4000, FO = 3500, d̄ = 1.5d,
b = 1, and γO = γM = 0.
production cost, it is was worth mentioning that the manufacturer can take advan-
tage of the pooling character of car sharing and produce fewer cars. Furthermore,
since she maintains ownership of the fleet for the entire useful lifetime D, she can
also benefit from the resale value of the vehicles. Thus, the profit generated from
providing Membership to the i segment is given by
ΠMi = niD
(
FM + (pM − ωpO) āq∗iM
)
− (1− h) cS. (16)
The first term in (16) indicates the profit originating from the subscription fees as
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well as the total usage of the vehicles over the D time periods, and the second term
is the cost associated with the production and depreciation of the fleet.
The fleet size S determines the pooling character of Membership. Specifically, in
a typical car sharing scheme customers arrive to one of the designated parking lots
where they pick up the vehicle they have chosen, and after the reserved amount of time
they return the vehicle to the same parking lot. This description resembles the base
stock policy that recoverable spare parts facilities employ. Following the literature
on the inventory control of recoverable spare parts (Feeney and Sherbrooke, 1966;
Smith, 1977), we model Membership as an (S − 1, S) inventory system, in which the
base stock level S corresponds to the total number of vehicles in the system. In such
systems, a replacement item is ordered upon arrival of each demand. Customers arrive
to the system according to Poisson process N = {N(t) : t ≥ 0} with rate λ̄ (customers
per unit of time). The lead-time L corresponds to each customer’s (stochastic) usage
duration, and it is distributed according to general probability distribution G(·) with
mean τ̄ . In our setting the arrival rate can be expressed as λ̄ = nM ξ
T
, where ξ is
the number of times a customer uses a vehicle (i.e., number of trips) during a period
of length T and nM is the total number of customers that choose Membership in
the given period. The mean “recovery” time (i.e., time until a customer returns
the vehicle) is τ̄ =
q∗M
ξ











. Figure 12 illustrates the operation of our inventory
control system.
We also assume that when all cars are occupied by other customers a new customer
arriving to the system waits until a car becomes available (i.e., the inventory system
works under full backordering). This is a realistic assumption, given that in practice
i) the industry-set service level ā is relatively high and ii) customers can reserve
in advance and make the appropriate adjustments in their schedule if a car is not







S Vehicles in 
circulation (“recovery”).
Figure 12: Membership as an inventory control system.
a fraction a of their requests will be backordered (i.e., they will have to wait/reschedule
or visit a different parking lot) through the cost pa, which then can be viewed as the
provider’s backordering cost.
Under the aforementioned assumptions, the inventory system is an ample capacity
(M/G/∞) queueing system; therefore, from Palm’s theorem, the steady state prob-
ability that s vehicles are occupied (i.e., in circulation) can be given by the Poisson
distribution with rate Λ,








is the workload of the system. For large enough values of
customer population, Λ becomes sufficiently large; therefore, we can approximate the
Poisson distribution with a normal distribution of mean and variance Λ and c.d.f Φ(k)
(Zipkin, 1998).4 Under Membership, the manufacturer needs to guarantee at least an
ā service level. She can achieve that by choosing an S such that the constraint (18)
is satisfied.
ā = 1− a ≤ Φ(S). (18)
However, the manufacturer has no incentive to exceed ā; therefore, it is straightfor-
ward to show that at optimality she chooses S∗ = Λ + zā
√
Λ which we can expand to
4For large enough customer population we can also ignore possible state dependency issues at-













where zā indicates the standard normal z value corresponding to the service level ā.
Having introduced ΠOi and Π
M
i we can fully characterize the manufacturer’s max-
imization problem for each possible market configuration. For instance, after the
introduction of Membership the manufacturer can calculate the optimal values F ∗O,
F ∗M , p
∗
M that induce the High segment to choose Ownership and the Low segment to
choose Membership by maximizing
max
FO,FM ,pM≥0


















FO ≤ yH − ωpOd
FM ≤ yL −
(




Ū∗LM ≥ 1FO≤F̄LO Ū
∗
LO.
The manufacturer’s maximization problems for the rest of the market configura-
tions are shown in the Appendix.
3.4 Analysis
In this section we solve and interpret the results from both the customer’s and the
manufacturer’s problems. Conditional on the customer’s ability to participate in
(afford) the j mode, the customer’s problem entails the determination of the optimal
usage q∗ij. The manufacturer factors in the customers’ decisions and then determines




In what follows we characterize customers’ usage decisions in isolation from the man-
ufacturer’s decisions. That is, at this point O and M are treated as given.
Proposition 1 If the customers of segment i were to participate in transportation
mode j, then at optimality they would use a vehicle for q∗ij = min
{


















It is straightforward to see that q∗ij is nondecreasing in d, d̄, yi and nonincreasing
in pj, pa, b and ωj. For instance, as we can see in Figure 14, q
∗
iM decreases as pM
increases. Reasonably, customers would use a vehicle less as the hourly reservation
fee becomes greater. It is more insightful, however, to contrast the q∗iM , as it varies
with pM , to q
∗
iO. Specifically, from Figure 14 we see that for greater values of pM
customers would decide to use a vehicle under Membership less compared to a vehicle
under Ownership. This is attributed to the use-related costs of Membership. Namely,
as such costs increase customers are forced to adjust their vehicle usage and possibly
resort to more efficient driving patterns (e.g., avoid discretionary trips). This behavior
is in accordance with the claims made by car sharing providers that customers tend to
drive less after joining a car sharing program. However, Propositions 2 and 3 identify
conditions under which such claims can be challenged. Under these conditions, a
customer who migrates from Ownership to Membership may actually increase the
environmental burden caused by higher GHG transportation emissions.
Proposition 2 If pM > p̂M , then a value ȳ exists such that the vehicle usage under
Membership is higher than the vehicle usage under Ownership for all y < ȳ.
As we can see in Figure 13 above a certain level of y, customers can afford both
transportation modes. For moderate values of y customers tend to use a vehicle more
under Membership as opposed to under Ownership. Vehicle usage is limited under
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Ownership because of the high fixed cost FO (i.e., customers are left with limited
surplus after paying FO). This effect is reversed as the budget y increases. For higher
budget values, customers realize higher surplus that they can then spend on vehicle
usage up to d̄. The same customers are forced to choose q∗iM < q
∗
iO because vehicle
usage is “penalized” more under Membership (higher pM and pa).
Printed by Mathematica for Students
Figure 13: Optimal vehicle usage with respect to the budget yi. The parameters
used are a = 0.05, pa = 21, pO = 7, FO = 3000, FM = 60, pM = 10, d̄ = 1710, d = 0,
b = 1, w = 0.5, and γO = γM = 0.
Proposition 3 Under the following cases a value p̄M exists such that the vehicle
usage under Membership is be higher than the vehicle usage under Ownership for all
pM < p̄M .
I. d̄− abpa < d < yi−FMapa and q
∗
iO < d.
II. d < d̄− abpa < yi−FMapa and q
∗











Interestingly, in Figure 14 we see that for smaller values of pM (which are still
higher than the gas cost pO), customers selecting Membership tend to use a vehicle
more than the customers under Ownership. The rationale behind this observation
arises from the fact that, because of the decreasing variable (usage-related) cost pM
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and the lower fixed Membership cost (at least as observed in practice; see Zipcar,
2012d) FM , customers realize a higher (monetary) surplus that they consume by
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Figure 14: Optimal vehicle usage with respect to the price pM . The parameters
used are a = 0.05, pa = 21, pO = 7, yi = 4000, FO = 3000, FM = 60, d̄ = 1710, d = 0,
b = 1, w = 0.5, and γO = γM = 0.
Propositions 2 and 3 support our initial claim that the assessment of the envi-
ronmental character of car sharing programs is not a trivial subject. Although car
sharing has received wide support from both NGOs and government agencies as an
environmentally beneficial business model (U.S. EPA, 2009), our findings call for
caution because they indicate that it is possible for such business models to cause an
increase in the environmental burden.6
However, for the assessment of car sharing’s environmental implications to be
complete, the changes in vehicle use need to be evaluated in conjunction with the
5Customers benefit from higher vehicle usage since Ūij is increasing in qij .
6The side effects of increased vehicle usage can be mitigated if the car sharing fleet comprises
environmentally friendly vehicles (e.g., hybrids, electric vehicles). However, such vehicles tend to
be more expensive, in this way affecting the manufacturer’s decision to include them in the fleet.
Therefore, this case merits further investigation, which we conduct in a future extension of this paper
(i.e., in the rest of the paper we assume that the manufacturer offers only conventional vehicles). In
2009, car sharing fleets comprised 87% conventional vehicles. Frost & Sullivan (2010) estimates that,
by 2016, conventional vehicles with internal combustion engines will still dominate the car sharing
market with a 60% share.
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manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production decisions. Such decisions will deter-
mine the segments’ self-selection and provide us with a clear picture of both the
resulting production volume and vehicle usage. In the next section we characterize
the manufacturer’s decisions.
3.4.2 Manufacturer’s Problem
Before the introduction of Membership as a transportation mode, the manufacturer
has two options: i) sell only to the high segment or ii) sell to both segments. Lemma
3 characterizes the manufacturer’s decisions.
Lemma 2 Prior to the introduction of Membership the manufacturer finds it optimal
to sell to both segments if and only if nL > ñL and yL > ỹL. In this case, she optimally
sets FO = F̄LO.
In deciding whether to sell to both segments, the manufacturer needs to balance the
trade-off between lower a profit margin and a higher sales volume. The manufacturer
can recoup the loss in the profit margin only when the size of the low segment exceeds
the threshold ñL. In this case, she has no incentive to allow for surplus in the low
segment’s budget; therefore, she sets FO = F̄LO. The requirement yL > ỹL ensures
that the low segment’s budget is sufficient to guarantee a positive margin for the
manufacturer. In the rest of the analysis, we use the manufacturer’s optimal decisions
and profitability prior to the introduction of Membership as our benchmark scenario.
The manufacturer’s optimization problem entails the determination of the opti-
mal FO, pM , FM , and S. With respect, to the pricing decisions pM and FM , it is
easy to show that different combinations of (pM , FM) can result in the same profit
for the manufacturer. Therefore, in order to avoid unrealistic solutions, we remove
one “degree of freedom” from the manufacturer by determining the membership fee,
FM , exogenously. A survey of the membership fees found in practice reveals, that FM
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contributes or subtracts a rather trivial amount to the manufacturer’s profit or cus-
tomers’ transportation budget, respectively. The number of decision variables, and
the sequential nature of the manufacturer’s decision making process render the ana-
lytical derivation of insights challenging. For that reason we conduct a full factorial
experimental design for the parameters of the manufacturer’s problem and through
numerical optimization we generate a large population of optimal solutions. In what
follows, we provide the different parameter values we used for our factorial experi-
ment.
Motivated by the results obtained from surveys (Millard-Ball et al., 2005; Cervero
et al., 2007) regarding the travel characteristics of car sharing members we assume
that customers’ driving patterns can be categorized under four different profiles that
are uniquely characterized by the values of d and ω. Before we describe the approach
we adopted in order to estimate d and ω, we need to remind the reader that, in our
setting, vehicle usage is defined as the total amount of time that a customer reserves
or keeps the vehicle “off-base.” Actual driving may occur only for a part of this time,
which we capture through the parameter ω. From Santos et al. (2011) we borrow
Table 1, which shows the average annual vehicle miles traveled per household. Based
Table 1: Average annual vehicle miles per household.
Number of Vehicles
Income 0 1 2 3 4+
< $25k 530 8,430 1,551 22,490 34,444
$25k-$50k 1,871 10,089 20,625 26,583 41,383
$50k-$75k 3,160 12,008 23,381 33,126 44,279
$75k+ 2,792 13,706 27,579 37,146 47,015
on Table 1 and assuming an average driving speed of 30 miles/hour (this is a typical
assumption in transportation studies; see Frost & Sullivan, 2010; Santos et al., 2011),
we construct Table 2, which indicates the average annual vehicle (actual) driving
hours per household. The values in Table 2 vary from as low as 18 hours to as high
as 1576 hours.
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Table 2: Average annual vehicle driving hours per household.
Number of Vehicles
Income 0 1 2 3 4+
< $25k 18 281 52 750 1148
$25k-$50k 62 336 688 886 1379
$50k-$75k 105 400 779 1104 1476
$75k+ 93 457 919 1238 1567
Table 2 can provide useful estimations only if its values are combined with values
of ω. Regarding the estimation of ω, it is useful to investigate the different purposes
for which customers use their vehicles. Most transportation studies (e.g., Millard-Ball
et al., 2005; Cervero et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2011) identify four major trip pur-
poses: i) Shopping/Buying Groceries ii) Recreational/Social Activities iii) Traveling
To-From Work/Work-Related Activities, and iv) Personal Business. It is true that a
customer can be involved into a mixture of these types of activities, and that a market
can include a mix of such customers. However, in pursuance of basic insights, we use
“pure” scenarios where a single, distinct profile exists in the market and we appose
the results. Specifically, in order to shed light on how different driving patterns affect
the manufacturer’s as well as customers’ decisions, we categorize the aforementioned
trip purposes under the following four distinct profiles.
Profile 1 : Shopping/Buying Groceries, under which d = 190 hours/year (≈ 1/2 hours/day)
and ω = 1. Typical activities under this profile would include daily errands (e.g.,
going to the super market, or dry cleaner), which are usually performed in an
efficient and expeditious manner.
Profile 2 : Recreational/Social Activities, under which d = 1140 hours/year (≈ 3 hours/day)
and ω = 0.5. Although such activities may not take place daily, upon occur-
rence they may require considerable amount of time, only a part of which may
involve actual driving (e.g., helping a friend move, or taking a short trip on the
4th of July).
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Profile 3 : Traveling To-From Work/Work-Related Activities, under which d = 2280
hours/year (≈ 9 hours/day; assuming 250 working days in a calendar year)
and ω = 0.1. This profile captures cases in which a vehicle is mainly used to
commute to and from someone’s workplace.
Profile 4 : Personal Business, under which d = 2280 hours/year (≈ 9 hours/day; assum-
ing 250 working days in a calendar year) and ω = 0.5. The difference between
Profile 3 and Profile 4 is that the amount of time that actual driving occurs is
higher under Profile 4. This can describe settings in which vehicle use is related
to the operation and/or development of someone’s personal business (e.g., so-
licitation of potential customers or consultation of existing customers with on
site visits).
The set (d, ω) = {(190, 1), (1140, 0.5), (2280, 0.1), (2280, 0.5)} represents Profiles 1-
4 compactly. This set also corresponds to (dω) = {190, 570, 228, 1140} actual driving
hours and is representative of the range of values calculated in Table 2. Although the
typology of the profiles we devised is by no means exhaustive, we should highlight
that Profiles 1-4 should be seen in juxtaposition to each other. Namely, it is the
relative values of d and ω that shape the definition of Profiles 1-4 and which can
potentially induce different manufacturer and customer decisions.
Table 3 summarizes the values we use for all of our parameters, which form 104,976
numerical instances (i.e., unique numerical combinations). The length of a time period
is considered to be one year which comprises T = 8760 hours and, therefore, prices and
vehicle usage are expressed on a yearly basis ($/hour and hours/year respectively).
In the Appendix we provide a thorough explanation of the methods we employed to
estimate our parameters.
In the rest of the analysis we proceed to the numerical optimization of the man-
ufacturer’s profit for each possible market configuration (Cases 1-7 ) and we identify
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Table 3: Summary of the parameters used in the numerical optimization.
Description Symbol Values
Vehicle Useful Life D 5 years
Vehicle Production Cost c
{
$15× 103, $22.5× 103, $25× 103
}
% of the Vehicle Production h {0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
Cost Retained after D years
Vehicle Operating Cost pO {4, 6.5, 9}$/hour
Cost of not Finding pa {69.80ω, 81.46ω, 104.6ω}$/hour
a Vehicle Available
Demand Slope b {15, 25, 35}hours/$
Transportation Budget (yH , yL)
{
($5.525× 103, $3.90× 103), ($8.125× 103, $5.525× 103), ($11.375× 103, $8.125× 103)
}
Customer Population (nH , nL)
{
(2.807× 103, 1.951× 103), (2.193× 103, 3.049× 103)
}
Annual Membership Fee FM {$50, $150, $250}
Service Level ā {90%, 95%, 98%}
Driving Profile (d, ω) {(190, 1), (1140, 0.5), (2280, 0.1), (2280, 0.5)}
Maximum Usage d̄ {1.5d, 2d}hours/year
Requirements
Intrinsic Preference to (γO, γM ) (0, 0)
Own/Be a Member
the most profitable one. We are interested in the implications of the manufacturer’s
decisions on profitability, consumer surplus, and environmental burden.
3.4.2.1 Implications on Profitability
A potential involvement of the auto manufacturer in the car sharing business can affect
her profit through a number of different mechanisms. Specifically, by introducing
Membership, the manufacturer may be able to enjoy a decrease in total production
cost due to the pooling effect of car sharing. Additionally, the manufacturer may be
able to expand her market by allowing customers who previously could not afford
Ownership to use Membership as their transportation mode. On the other hand, by
offering Membership the manufacturer becomes vulnerable to sales cannibalization.
The manufacturer can mitigate the cannibalization effect through the pricing decisions
FO and pM . However, given the fact that under Membership vehicle usage not only
constitutes a source of revenue but also a cost for the manufacturer (since she is
responsible for the operating cost of the vehicles), it is unclear how the prices FO
and pM will affect the usage decisions of the customers. Ceteris paribus, customers
derive higher utility under a transportation mode that allows them larger vehicle
usage. In order to gradually build our understanding of the drivers that shape the
manufacturer’s profit, we start by studying the segments’ self-selection towards the
transportation modes.
60
Observation 1 On average, the manufacturer achieves higher market expansion when
customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 1 or Profile 3. On the contrary, if the
customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 4, then the manufacturer does not realize
any changes in the composition of the customer base.
In Figure 15(a) we observe that market coverage is more extensive under Profile 1
and Profile 3 and it decreases under Profile 2 and Profile 4 (i.e., more instances of
DNDN are realized). This is consistent with the dω values of the profiles. Higher
values of dω imply that customers’ minimum vehicle usage requirements (minimum
actual driving time) are costlier, which can increase the number of instances in which
the transportation budget is rendered insufficient.
We also see that Membership prevails in Profiles 1 & 3. Once more, these profiles
are characterized by small dω. Therefore, by switching to Membership, customers
of these profiles are freed from the high fixed cost of Ownership and can actually
derive more utility by increasing their vehicle usage. For that exact reason, as shown
in Figure 15(b), market expansion occurs more often under Profiles 1 & 3. Market
expansion under Profile 1 is realized in fewer instances than under Profile 3, because
under Profile 1 market coverage before the introduction of Membership is at its high-
est. In contrast to Profiles 1 & 3 we do not observe many instances of Membership
under Profile 2. In this profile, customers have higher dω; therefore, the manufac-
turer cannot profitably lure them to choose Membership. This is more pronounced
under Profile 4, under which no instances of Membership are observed. It is also ap-
parent from Figure 15(a) that the introduction of Membership not only creates new
demand but also cannibalizes the sales of vehicles. For instance, consider in Profile 1
the transition from (O,DN) (i.e., the high segment chooses Ownership and the low
segment does not participate) to (M,M) (both the high and the low segments choose
Membership). The fact that the manufacturer induces such cannibalization can be
attributed to the pooling effect of car sharing (i.e., the same number of customers
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can be served with fewer vehicles), through which she can possibly fully recoup the
losses generated by the demand cannibalization.
Further investigating the composition of each profile, we see that Profile 2 has
more instances of Ownership compared to Profile 1. The reason is that Profile 3 is
characterized by smaller ω = 0.1, which renders the option of Ownership appealing
to customers due to its smaller variable cost (under Membership the variable cost is
higher because of the manufacturer markup; furthermore, customers are exposed to
the pa cost of not finding a vehicle available). That is, despite the existence of Mem-
bership, customers may still be able to affordably meet or even exceed their minimum
usage requirements d under Ownership. We continue our analysis by describing the
levers that the manufacturer uses in order to induce the changes in the composition
of the customer base.
Observation 2 Before the introduction of Membership, the manufacturer on average
charges the highest selling price under Profile 1 and next under Profile 3. After the
introduction of Membership the highest selling occurs at its maximum under Profile
3. On average, the highest hourly rate is realized under Profile 1 and it decreases with
respect to the rest of the profiles.
As we can see in Figure 16(a), before the introduction of Membership the vehicle
selling price is consistent with the minimum actual driving requirements dω of each
profile. For instance, Profile 4 is accompanied by the maximum dω = 1140 hours;
therefore, the manufacturer charges the lowest FO in order to stimulate demand for
vehicles. Similarly, the highest price is offered under Profile 1. Given the small dω of
Profile 1 and the lack of transportation alternatives, it is easier for the manufacturer
to extract a larger part of customers surplus by charging a higher price and still allow
them to meet their usage requirements.
After the introduction of Membership the selling price is the highest under Profile
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(b) Market expansion after the introduction of Membership.
Figure 15: The segments’ self-selection before and after the introduction of Member-
ship. O indicates Ownership, M indicates Membership and DN indicates no partici-
pation. For instance, (O,DN) means that the high segments chooses Ownership and
the low segment relies on the outside option (i.e., cannot afford Ownership or Mem-
bership). Each profile is associated with different customer driving patterns. Profile
1 indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and ω = 0.5, Profile 3
indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
option for customers of Profile 3. Therefore, the manufacturer increases the selling
price FO in order to increase the appeal of Membership, through which she can po-
tentially enjoy a decrease in the total production cost due to the pooling effect. The
large dω of Profile 2 does not allow the manufacturer price flexibility.
In Figure 16(b) we also find that the hourly rates are in accordance with the
ranking of ω across profiles. That is, since under Membership the manufacturer is
responsible for the operating cost pO, higher values of ω imply higher rates pM . The
hourly rate appears to be particularly high under Profile 1, because the small dω
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allows the manufacturer to extract customer surplus with out losses in the demand.
In what follows we examine how the aforementioned pricing strategies and the re-

















































(b) Average optimal hourly rate of Membership.
Figure 16: The auto manufacturer’s optimal pricing strategies before and after the
introduction of Membership. Each profile is associated with different customer driving
patterns. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and
ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280
and ω = 0.5.
Observation 3 The manufacturer is on average better off by offering car sharing
in conjunction with the traditional selling of vehicles. The manufacturer benefits the
most when customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 1.
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We examine the manufacturer’s profitability before and after the introduction
of Membership as a transportation alternative. As it can be seen in Figure 17(a),
prior to the introduction of Membership the manufacturer is able to achieve the
highest profit when customers’ driving patterns fall first under Profile 1, then Profile
3, Profile 2, and last Profile 4. This observation is consistent with the extent of
market coverage observed in Figure 15(a) for the various profiles. In Figure 17(b)
we see that the manufacturer benefits from the introduction of Membership under
Profiles 1-3 while she realizes no change under Profile 4. The largest percent increase
in the manufacturer’s average profit occurs under the profiles in which Membership
prevails (i.e., Profile 1 and Profile 3). The percent change in the manufacturer’s
average profit maintains the same ordering with respect to the profiles as the average
profit before the introduction of Membership. The benefit to the manufacturer under
Profile 1 is sightly larger than under Profile 3 because in the latter more instances of
Ownership materialize (Figure 15(a)).
These observations can provide clear guidance to the manufacturer regarding her
dilemma on whether to become involved in the car sharing business. If customers’
driving patters are characterized by Profile 1 or Profile 3, we find strong evidence that
the manufacturer will benefit from such involvement. Profile 2 offers small benefits
that in practice may not outweigh the capital cost (e.g., investment in IT infrastruc-
ture, long-term leasing of parking locations; Hart et al., 2005) that the manufacturer
incurs when she creates a car sharing network. Our findings also strongly suggest
that when customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 4, a potential involvement of
the auto manufacturer in car sharing will be at best futile.
Observation 3 establishes the benefit in profit that the manufacturer (especially
under Profile 1 or Profile 3) can derive by offering mobility solutions in conjunction
with the traditional sales channel. However, such a benefit can comprise an increase
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(b) % Increase in the average optimal profit after the introduction of Membership.
Figure 17: The manufacturer’s average optimal profit for different driving patterns
before and after the introduction of Membership. Each profile is associated with
different customer driving patterns. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2
indicates d = 1140 and ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile
4 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
revenue may potentially stem from an increase in the total vehicle usage, either due to
market expansion (i.e., customers who before the introduction of Membership could
not afford Ownership, they can now afford Membership) and/or an increase in the
vehicle usage from customers that are active both before and after the introduction
of Membership (e.g., consider the increase in driving that a customer, who before the
introduction of Membership chooses Ownership, may commit when freed by the fixed
cost FO after Membership is offered). The decrease in the total production cost can be
attributed to the pooling effect of car sharing. Therefore, in order to disentangle the
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main forces that shape the manufacturer’s profit increase, we need to investigate how
vehicle usage and production volume change after the introduction of Membership.
Observation 4 After the introduction of Membership the average driving time in-
creases under Profile 1, Profile 2, and Profile 3 while it remains the same under
Profile 4. The highest increase occurs under Profile 3 and Profile 1. The increase
in total driving time is primarily attributed to the market expansion achieved by the
manufacturer after the introduction of Membership.
Figure 18(a) illustrates how customers who were active both before and after the
introduction of Membership adjust their driving time after Membership is offered. The
decrease in the driving time under Profile 1 is consistent with our previous explanation
regarding the manufacturer’s ability to extract customer surplus and the high hourly
rate we observed in Figure 16(b). We also see that customers of the High segment
of Profile 3 increase their actual driving time because they benefit from lower hourly
rates. However, Figure 18(a) needs to be studied in conjunction with Figure 18(b) in
which we show the percent change in the total driving time. Specifically, in Figure
18(b) we see that the change in the actual driving time is in accordance with the
market expansion observed in Figure 15(b). Combining the findings of Figures 18(a)
and 18(b) we conclude that the overall increase in the total driving time after the
introduction of Membership can be mainly attributed to the market expansion effect.
It is worth mentioning that our finding regarding the change in the driving time of
the High segment of Profile 1, offers support to Zipcar’s claim that after becoming
members, their customers reduce the total amount of time they drive. However, this
claim does not universally hold for all of our driving profiles.
Observation 5 After the introduction of Membership the production volume on av-
erage decreases under Profile 1, Profile 2, and Profile 3 while it remains the same
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(a) % Change in the average optimal driving time of the customers who were active






























































(b) Percent change in the average optimal total driving time after the introduction
of Membership.
Figure 18: Change in the average optimal driving times for different driving patterns
before and after the introduction of Membership. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and
ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and
ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
The percent change in the average total number of vehicles produced, shown in
Figure 19, is in accordance with the number of Membership instances found in Figure
15(a). Namely, the pooling effect is strongest under Profile 1, while it decreases under
Profile 3 due to the higher number of Ownership instances that Profile 3 comprises.
Observations 4 and 5 give rise to Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 The benefit to the manufacturer after the introduction of Membership






















































Figure 19: Percent change in the average production volume after the introduction
of Membership. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140
and ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates
d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
(due to market expansion) to a greater extent and the pooling effect to a lesser extent
under Profile 2, and iii) evenly from the revenue increase and the pooling effect under
Profile 3.
It has already been shown that Profiles 1 and 3 are the most appealing to the
manufacturer. However, the factors that drive the increase in profit vary across the
different profiles. In particular, as we can see in Figure 20, pooling is the dominant
effect under Profile 1 due to the prevalence of Membership. Revenue contribution
in Profile 1 is limited due to the higher pM (see Figure 16(b)) and the low driving
requirements, dω = 190. In Profile 3 the contributions of the revenue increase and cost
decrease are almost equal. The reason is found in the fact that, although under Profile
3 we have observed many Membership instances (see Figure 15(a)), and therefore
we would expect the pooling effect to dominate, we have also found that the total
driving time increases the most (see Figure 18(b)), which results in an equally strong
contribution to the manufacturer’s profit increase. Under Profile 2, the fewer instances
of Membership limit the effect of pooling, allowing the contribution from the revenue
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Figure 20: Percent of the manufacturer’s profit increase attributed to revenue in-
crease and cost decrease along with a detailed breakdown of the revenue. Profile 1
indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and ω = 0.5, Profile 3
indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
3.4.2.2 Implications on Consumer Surplus
Given the aforementioned changes in the customer base composition and total driving
time, we are interested in investigating how the consumer surplus, Ūij, is affected.
Changes in the consumer surplus may originate from changes i) in the number of
customers that become active after the introduction of Membership (i.e., customers
who could not afford Ownership, and who become active by choosing Membership),
ii) in the total driving time that affect the utility, Uij (qij), that customers derive
and/or, iii) in the monetary surplus, yi − Cj (qij), that customers appropriate.
Observation 6 After the introduction of Membership the average consumer surplus
increases when customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 1, Profile 2, or Profile
3, while it remains unchanged under Profile 4. The largest increase happens under
Profile 1. The change in the surplus can be attributed to the market expansion effect.
The Low segment appears to benefit the most from the introduction of Membership.
Observation 6 reveals the harmony between manufacturer profitability and con-
sumer surplus. Namely, under Profiles 1-3 both the manufacturer and the customers
benefit from the introduction of Membership. Figures 21(a) and 21(b) can help us
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enhance our understanding about the drivers of the consumer surplus increase. Specif-
ically, in Figure 21(a) we see that the surplus of the customers who were active both
before and after the introduction of Membership increases under Profiles 1-3. The
customers of the Low segment appear to benefit the most from the introduction of
Membership as they realize the largest increase in the surplus. In Figure 18(a), we
have seen that the Low segment after the introduction of Membership does not not
change its driving time. Therefore, we can safely conclude that the significant in-
crease in the surplus of the Low segment we observe in Figure 21(a) stems exclusively
from the monetary surplus that customers can enjoy while being able to meet their
minimum vehicle usage requirements.7 Especially for the High segment of Profile 1,
we see that after the introduction of Membership the consumer surplus increases by
20% even though the driving time decreases.
As expected, in Figure 21(b) we see that the overall consumer surplus increases.
However, the magnitude of the increase shown in Figure 21(b) is smaller than the
magnitude observed in Figure 21(a). The reason is that Figure 21(b) also incorpo-
rates the cases in which customers before the introduction of Membership could not
afford Ownership. After Membership is offered, these customers benefit from becom-
ing active. However, the manufacturer’s pricing is probably set such that it allows
these customers to meet their minimum usage requirements, d, but at the same time
exhausts their transportation budget (i.e., not allowing for monetary surplus). Over-
all, the highest surplus increase happens under Profile 1 because of the large number
of Membership instances already observed in Figure 15(a).
7This effect is more pronounced for the Low segment of Profile 3. Customers of this profile are
characterized by relatively small dω and small ω = 0.1, which in compliance with the small pM
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(a) % Change in the average consumer surplus of the customers who were active


































































(b) Percent change in the consumer surplus after the introduction of Membership.
Figure 21: Change in the average consumer surplus for different driving patterns
before and after the introduction of Membership. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and
ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and
ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.5.
3.4.2.3 Implications on Environmental Burden
We now divert our attention to the environmental implications of the manufacturer’s
decision to offer car sharing by calculating the change in the total environmental bur-
den after the introduction of Membership. The total environmental burden comprises
the CO2 emissions generated during the production phase and the CO2 emissions gen-
erated during the usage phase of vehicle. According to Honda (2012), Toyota (2012),
and Ford (2012), in 2010 the vehicle production of i) Honda resulted in 755 kg CO2
per vehicle produced, ii) Toyota resulted in 900 kg CO2 per vehicle produced, and iii)
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Ford resulted in 1,010 kg CO2 per vehicle produced, respectively. We calculate the
average of these reported emissions to be 888.33 kg CO2 per vehicle produced and
we allocate it uniformly over the service life expectancy of a vehicle which we assume
to be 10 years (Kobayashi, 1997). Hence, we arrive at 88.83 kg CO2 per vehicle pro-
duced. With respect to the vehicle usage phase, we estimate estimate 0.31 kg CO2 per
mile by using the industry average 29.20 MPG (Honda, 2012) along with assuming
8.92 kg CO2/gallon (U.S. EPA, 2012) and an average driving speed of 30 miles/hour.
We combine this information with our findings regarding the total production volume
and the total driving time8 and we make Observation 7.
Observation 7 After the introduction of Membership the average environmental bur-
den increases when customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 1, Profile 2, or Pro-
file 3, while it remains unchanged under Profile 4. The largest increase materializes
under Profile 3.
Figure 22 demonstrates that for the profiles under which the manufacturer realizes
a profit increase, the environmental burden also increases. This reveals an underlying
tension between manufacturer profitability and environmental sustainability. Specifi-
cally, the largest increase in the environmental burden occurs under Profile 3 which is
also characterized by the largest increase in profit (Figure 17(b)). It is straightforward
to establish that the overall increase in the environmental burden is due to the perva-
sive market expansion effect. For instance, although we have seen that under Profile
1 the decrease in the production volume is rather substantial (almost 75% decrease;
see Figure 19), this decrease is not sufficient to counterbalance the environmental im-
plications of the increase in total driving time due to the expansion of the customer
8In the previous section, for the sake of expositional parsimony we did not provide the results
about the total driving time and total production volume before or after the introduction of Mem-
bership. Instead, we illustrated the corresponding percent changes (Figures 18(a), 18(b), and 19).
The results about the total driving time and total production volume are readily available from the
authors upon request.
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base. This is more pronounced when customers’ driving patterns fall under Profile 3
because in this case the pooling effect is weaker (smaller decrease in the production
volume) while the increase in the total driving time is stronger. The limited market





































































Figure 22: Percent change in the environmental burden after the introduction of
Membership. Profile 1 indicates d = 190 and ω = 1, Profile 2 indicates d = 1140 and
ω = 0.5, Profile 3 indicates d = 2280 and ω = 0.1, and Profile 4 indicates d = 2280
and ω = 0.5.
Our findings in Observation 7 and Figure 22 are in direct contrast with the claims
in favor of the environmental character of car sharing. However, we need to caution
the reader that it has been assumed that the environmental burden caused by the
outside option ∅, is negligible. This may not always hold true (e.g., the outside
option may comprise other less energy efficient transportation modes like taxi cabs),
in which case the environmental implications of the market expansion effect may be
relatively less pronounced. Furthermore, car sharing may offer additional collateral
benefits which we have not quantified in our analysis. For instance, such benefits
include the decrease in the need for parking spaces or the facilitation of customers
to use public transportation (e.g., many car sharing parking lots are conveniently
locate near metro stations). Therefore, our analysis may be considered a worst case
environmental scenario providing an upper bound for the environmental burden.
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3.4.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we want to identify how and to what extent our problem parameters
affect the manufacturer’s benefit from becoming involved in the car sharing business.
Towards this end, we use Global Sensitivity Analysis (Wagner, 1995; Souza et al.,
2004; Subramanian et al., 2011), which involves the regression of the performance
metric of interest (i.e., in our case the percent change in the manufacturer’s profit
after the introduction of Membership) on the problem parameters. Table 4 shows
the output of the multiple regression. The column of the standardized beta coef-
ficients reveals the relative importance of the different parameters. Namely, higher
absolute values of the standardized beta coefficients indicate a stronger effect of the
corresponding parameters on the manufacturer’s benefit.
Table 4: Regression output (Global Sensitivity Analysis). The “percent change in
manufacturer’s profit” after the introduction of Membership serves as the dependent
variable.
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
Parameter B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
Constant 1.094 0.026 42.450 0.000
yH -0.001 0.000 -2.471 -57.946 0.000
yL 0.001 0.000 2.212 51.889 0.000
w 0.665 0.018 0.370 37.065 0.000
pa -0.005 0.000 -0.337 -56.948 0.000
a -4.287 0.047 -0.268 -91.831 0.000
c 3.43× 10−5 0.000 0.225 76.793 0.000
h -1.610 0.023 -0.201 -68.698 0.000
pO 0.037 0.001 0.115 38.440 0.000
nL 6.530× 10−5 0.000 0.055 18.803 0.000
d −3.840× 10−5 0.000 -0.053 -3.701 0.000
d̄ 7.190× 10−7 0.000 0.002 0.151 0.880
b −4.860× 10−5 0.000 -0.001 -0.208 0.835
We find that the customers’ transportation budget exerts the strongest influence
on the manufacturer’s benefit. Although this may not be surprising at first glance, it
is worth highlighting the difference in the direction of this effect depending on whether
the budget is associated with the High or Low segment. Specifically, in Table 4 we see
that as the transportation budget, yL, of the Low segment increases, the benefit to the
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manufacturer also increases. This is because the manufacturer does not have to price
unprofitably low in order to induce customers to choose Membership. However, this
effect is reversed if the budget refers to the High segment. In this case, an increase in
the budget, yH , of the high segment causes a decrease in the manufacturer’s benefit.
The reason is that customers, who due to their higher yH can afford the fixed cost FO
of Ownership to a greater extent, may actually prefer to remain “loyal” to Ownership
since it is characterized by a smaller variable cost, cO < pM . These findings stress
the important role that location should play in the manufacturer’s decision making.
The portion of the vehicle usage time that actual driving occurs also has a signif-
icant effect on the manufacturer’s benefit. Although higher values of ω imply greater
actual driving time and therefore inflict a higher total operating cost on the manu-
facturer (under Membership the manufacturer is responsible for the operating cost of
the vehicle), we see that the manufacturer actually benefits more from increases in
ω. The reason is that higher values of ω can strain customers’ transportation bud-
gets. In this case, customers may be more willing to choose Membership because they
can stay within their transportation budget and either enjoy a monetary surplus or
an increase in their driving time. Once more, our findings reveal the importance of
location in the manufacturer’s benefit. All else the same, the manufacturer should
prefer to introduce Membership in areas where the driving patterns of the residents
are characterized by larger values of ω (e.g., universities, college-towns, or areas with
high-density population).
The availability of a reliable and interconnected public transportation system has
been identified as one of the most important prerequisites for the success of car
sharing programs (Millard-Ball et al., 2005). As a matter of fact, most car sharing
schemes are located in metropolitan cities with well-developed public transportation
systems (Zipcar, 2012b). In our model, the quality of the outside option is captured
through the cost pa. We have already established in Proposition 1 that increasing pa
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results in nonincreasing vehicle usage. Therefore, we expect the improvement in the
manufacturer’s benefit to diminish in pa. As pa increases, the manufacturer will likely
react by lowering pM in an effort to encourage vehicle usage and maintain customer
membership. Table 4 verifies our expectation by demonstrating the strong negative
effect of pa on the manufacturer’s benefit. A similar explanation applies to the also
strong negative effect of a (probability with which customers cannot find a vehicle
available in the car sharing fleet).
In our model, the parameters h ∈ (0, 1) and c define the value, R = hc, that a
vehicle retains after 5 years. It is clear that the residual value of the vehicle may
increase either due to an increase in the percent h and/or the production cost c.
If h increases, then the manufacturer can reap an additional benefit because under
Membership she maintains the ownership of the fleet. A similar argument, however,
holds true for the customers, who due to the higher residual value of the vehicles
may become more inclined towards choosing Ownership. We find that the latter
effect dominates over the former. Specifically, higher values of h hinder the manu-
facturer’s profit increase. Practically, this indicates that, everything else constant an
auto manufacturer of lower “reputation” (regarding the vehicle quality/durability)
benefits more compared to an auto manufacturer of higher “reputation” from offering
Membership. On the other hand, if the increase in the residual value originates from
an increase in the production cost, c, then this effect is reversed. An increase in the
production cost will affect the pricing decisions of the manufacturer, who in order
to maintain a profitable markup may have to price a customer segment out of the
market. This segment may be able to become active through Membership causing a
market expansion that clearly benefits the manufacturer. Table 4 verifies this positive
effect of c.
Another important cost parameter that shapes both the manufacturer’s and cus-
tomers’ decisions is the vehicle operating cost pO (i.e., cost of gasoline). Increasing gas
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prices strain customers’ transportation budgets, hence making it more likely for them
to choose Membership. However, the manufacturer’s profit margin is also impinged
upon since under Membership she is responsible for pO. Table 4 indicates that, of
these two opposing effects, the former prevails. Namely, we see that increasing prices
pO also results in a higher percent change in the manufacturer’s profit. This can be
clearly attributed to the customers’ higher willingness to adopt Membership as their
transportation mode. Therefore, if the auto manufacturer operates in an environment
where the cost of gasoline is high, then she can significantly improve her profitabil-
ity by becoming involved in the car sharing business. In this spirit, the car sharing
business has the potential to be a very effective way in which auto manufacturers
can hedge against or even benefit from possible federal gas tax increases. In a recent
interview, General Motors CEO Dan Akerson called for a $1 gas tax increase, claim-
ing that both his company and the entire industry would reap significant benefits.
His line of reasoning was that customers would be induced to purchase smaller and
more fuel efficient cars (CNNMoney, 2011), which resonates with our explanation re-
garding the effect of pO. However, offering mobility solutions in conjunction with the
traditional sales channels may provide superior benefits because no changes in the
product line design are required (such as design and production of new, smaller and
more fuel efficient vehicles).
3.5 Discussion and Directions for Future Research
In recent years, manufacturers from various industries have started focusing on pro-
viding solutions as opposed to strictly selling their products. This trend, known as
servicization, has also emerged in the transportation business in the form of car shar-
ing programs. Despite the increasing popularity and remarkable growth projections
of these programs, auto manufactures have been hesitant to engage in the car sharing
business. In this paper we study the auto manufacturer’s dilemma regarding whether
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to offer car sharing in conjunction with the traditional selling of vehicles. By explic-
itly modeling customers’ decisions regarding the choice of transportation mode and
vehicle usage we are able to characterize the manufacturer’s optimal strategy. The
environmental implications of this strategy are also identified and compared to the
claims made by car sharing providers and environmental agencies.
We find that on average the manufacturer benefits from becoming involved in
car sharing. This benefit is more pronounced when customers’ driving patterns are
characterized by low minimum driving requirements. We are able to completely
disentangle the drivers that shape the manufacturer’s benefit, and we identify the
pervasive character of the market expansion effect. The selling price of the vehicles
changes nonmonotonically with respect to the customers’ driving patterns, and it
may increase or decrease compared to the selling price before the introduction of
Membership. Consumers also benefit from the offering of Membership as they realize
a higher surplus. The customers of the Low segment appear to benefit the most.
This benefit stems from the monetary surplus that customers are able to appropriate
after the introduction of Membership. Regarding the environmental character of the
manufacturer’s strategy we find that, despite the decrease in the total production
volume, the total driving time increases as a result of the market expansion that
the manufacturer achieves after the introduction of Membership. This results in the
increase in the total environmental burden.
The aforementioned findings are based on a number of assumptions we made
during the formulation and analysis of our model. The relaxation of some of these
assumptions can further enrich our insights and offer great future research avenues.
The inclusion of hybrid and electric vehicles in the car fleet can affect both the eco-
nomic and environmental impacts. Although such vehicles are associated with lower
operating costs and reduced emissions, they also impose a higher production cost on
the manufacturer. Therefore, it is not clear whether the manufacturer would have an
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incentive to include such vehicles in the car sharing fleet. We have also assumed that
the manufacturer can optimally determine the selling price of the vehicles. However,
it may also be true that the selling price is determined “exogenously” based on the
pricing pressure from rival manufacturers. Adding the dimension of competition can
provide additional interesting insights.
From a consumer modeling perspective, it has been assumed that customers are
certain about their driving requirements. The introduction of uncertainty in usage
can disfavor the choice of Membership because customers face the danger of incurring
steep fees every time they exceed their reserved time.9 The incorporation of uncer-
tainty could be also combined with the use of a Multinomial Logit (MNL) choice
model. An MNL model can be used to capture the fact that for a variety of rea-
sons (e.g., bounded rationality; Huang et al., 2011) consumers are known to make
sub-optimal choices (i.e., choices that do not maximize their utility). Furthermore,
it would be reasonable to expand the profiles of the driving patterns and assume
that customers “randomize” among Profiles 1-4 with certain probabilities. Finally,
the effect of customers’ environmental consciousness or other behavioral traits (i.e.,
endowment effect) can be assessed by assigning a wider range of values to the intrinsic
preference parameters of our model.




THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE “EXPERIENCE
REFERENCE EFFECT” ON THE DESIGN OF SERVICES
4.1 Introduction
Assume that you are in pursuit of legal advice and, therefore, you are seeking to hire
a lawyer. During your search you become impressed by a specific law practice, which
has created a very useful website on which you can find legal information and forms
pertaining to your case which and also offers free consultation sessions. For that
reason, you decide to conduct business with that particular law firm and allow them
to handle all of your legal cases. Contemplate now the disappointment that you may
experience from realizing that the law firm is not devoting as much attention to your
cases as you initially expected. How does this disappointment affect your interaction
with the law firm? Do you believe that you would have experienced the same level of
disappointment if the firm had not invested in the website and had not offered free
consultation sessions? Had this been the case, would you have decided to conduct
business with the firm?
An ongoing debate among lawyers (especially new lawyers) has to do with whether
offering free consultation sessions constitutes a good business practice (Rodgers,
2011). Free consultation gives the service provider the opportunity to nudge the
customer towards making purchase. However, free consultation sessions are time
consuming, do not necessarily result in customer commitment and are by definition
free. A similar dilemma is faced by consulting firms, which may have to commit
significant resources during the sales pitch period.1 Thus, the decision of whether to
1A relevant term used in practice is that of consultative selling (Hanan, 2004).
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offer pre-consumption interactions with the customer is an open question for service
providers.
We tackle this dilemma by adopting a process-based view of services. In particular,
and as we have previously established (Chapter II), the novelty of the process-based
view of services resides in the realization that in services customer “value” is not
generated solely during the transaction point or the “core” offering of the service.
Under this conceptualization, a service provider can decide how much effort to allocate
not only at the transaction point but also before it. In order to to showcase the
service value and increase the likelihood of customers joining the service system, the
provider may exert additional costly effort before the core of the service without
obliging the customers to commit to a price. However, in this way customers may
form experience expectations and anchor to an “experience reference point.” Namely,
if in an effort to convince the customer to commit to the price, the provider “puts
her best foot forward” before the transaction point, then the customer may form
and anchor to a high reference point and expect the rest of the experiences to be
as high. Therefore, any experience glitches at the core offering that fall below that
reference point can cause customer disconfirmation, which will negatively impact the
provider’s reputations or profit. In this context we formulate and characterize the
optimal design in terms of effort allocation decisions of the service provider.
This essay extends the research presented in Chapter II. In Chapter II we strive
to shed light on some of the decisions that a service provider (henceforth she) needs
to make during the design phase of a service. However, one of the underlying assump-
tions in Chapter II is that the customer (henceforth he), upon entering the service
system, goes through the entire service process. Namely, the customer lacks the flex-
ibility to abandon the system (due to a sub-par service experience) and never receive
the service. Such an option can have significant implications for the service provider




Our positioning with respect to the service operations literature remains the same as
in Chapter II. Specifically, in accordance with the papers in that stream of literature,
we acknowledge the existence of variability in service systems. However, we do not
make any further assumptions on the sources of the variability. Such sources may
be as diverse as the stochastic service rates that result in long queues, the subjective
nature of services or even the fact that customers are unable to fully articulate their
preferences (Terwiesch and Loch, 2004). Carmon et al. (1995) challenge the tradi-
tional queuing analysis by focusing on the psychological implications of waiting. In
their paper the service is disaggregated into two stages, the waiting time and service
time segment, and it is assumed that the dissatisfaction level of the customers at
each segment changes with a different rate. The focus of their paper is on how the
allocation of the service to the different segments affects the customers’ final dissatis-
faction level in the context of necessary services in which customers cannot balk. The
question regarding how service design decisions are affected when customers have the
option to balk is left for future research.
A relatively recent stream of literature has addressed the temporal aspects of a
service delivery. Drawing upon the behavioral sciences (Loewenstein et al., 1993), the
studies in this stream (Chase and Dasu, 2001; Bitran et al., 2008; Dixon and Verma,
2010) investigate the effect of the sequence of service outcomes on customer experience
and satisfaction. We build on this line of work by incorporating this sequence effect
in the service design decisions. However, in our setting such effects are stochastic in
nature. We draw on behavioral theories such as adaptive expectations and prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; or see Kalyanaram and Winer, 1995 for em-
pirical evidence) to capture the customers’ decision making process. Reference effects
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have been studied extensively in the context of dynamic pricing strategies (Popescu
and Wu, 2007; Kopalle et al., 1996). To the best of our knowledge, our work consti-
tutes the first attempt to investigate the implications of “reference point” phenomena
on the provider’s service design decisions.
Our research is closely related to that of Aflaki and Popescu (2010). They propose
a behavioral dynamic model of a single firm and client relationship in which the
objective of the firm is to maximize customer lifetime value (CLV). In each period, the
service provider decides what service level to offer the customer. Improving service is
costly, but it increases customer satisfaction and retention rate. Our work is different
in that we assume static services that are not adjusted for each individual customer.
In our setting, service design entails an upfront irreversible commitment (through an
upfront investment) made at the blueprint level before the actual launch of the service.
Thus, once the service provider decides on the optimal profile of effort (i.e., the effort
she will exert at each stage of the service), this decision cannot be adjusted. Our
assumption is not restrictive. Potential tactical adjustments can be captured through
the stochastic nature of customer retention or abandonment. We believe that such an
assumption is more realistic and easily justified in all “mass” service offerings in which
the aforementioned decisions uniquely characterize the service (e.g., restaurants).
4.3 The Model
We envision the service delivery as a two-stage process, comprising a consumption
stage (Stage 2; the core) and a pre-consumption stage (Stage 1). The customer’s
first interaction with the service provider occurs at Stage 1 when he derives an initial
experience. Based on this experience, the customer continues in Stage 2 and commits
to a price (i.e., starts the consumption of the core) or abandons the service system.
If the customer proceeds to Stage 2, then he derives another (core) experience. If
the experience at Stage 2 is inferior to the reference point that the customer created
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at Stage 1, then he realizes a discrepancy between his expectations and the actual
service received. In this case, we assume that the customer will ask to be refunded
by the service provider. Through the refund we capture the negative impact that
customer disconfirmation may have on the provider’s profit (e.g., negative word-of-
mouth, customer failure to revisit the service system). In this context, the provider’s
problem can be characterized by equation (20).
max
e1≥0,e2≥0
Π = fp [e1] (1− δq [e2 − λe1])− c1e1 − c2e2. (20)
The decisions of the service provider entail the calculation of the efforts e1 and e2
that she exerts at the first and second stage of the service process, respectively. We
assume that the price, f > 0, that the provider charges for the service is determined
exogenously as a result of competitive pressure. In equation (20), p [e1] ∈ (0, 1) is the
probability with which customers join the service system right after the completion of
the first stage; q [e2 − λe1] ∈ (0, 1)2 is the probability with which customers ask for a
refund if the experience at the second stage is rendered unsatisfying; δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
fraction of the price that customers will be refunded; and c1, c2 represent the marginal
cost of effort that the provider exerts at the first and second stage respectively. We
further assume that p is increasing concave in e1 (i.e.,
∂p
∂e1




q is decreasing convex in the “effective” effort (e2 − λe1) (i.e., ∂q∂(e2−λe1) < 0 and
∂2q
∂2(e2−λe1) > 0). The parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) captures the “experience reference effect.”
We assume that as the provider’s effort at the second stage exceeds the effort at the
first stage, the probability, q [e2 − λe1], that customers ask for a refund decreases
asymptotically. Figure 23 depicts our service process.
Under the aforementioned assumptions, we proceed to the differentiation of the
2For expositional parsimony, in the rest of the analysis we omit the arguments e1 and e2 − λe1





Figure 23: Service delivery process.





terminate. Therefore, the existence of an optimal profile of efforts e = {e∗1, e∗2} is










∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. Since the first
leading principal minor of |H| is |H1| = ∂
2Π
∂2e1
< 0, joint concavity of (20) is ensured
if and only if the second principal minor of |H| is positive. The latter is true if and
only if δ < δ̂. Proposition 1 summarizes our findings.
Proposition 1 If δ < δ̂, then an interior profile of efforts e∗ = {e∗1, e∗2} > 0 is
guaranteed to exist. At optimality, the provider’s efforts as Stage 1 and Stage 2
satisfy
(






= c1 + λc2, and −fpδ ∂q∂(e2−λe1) = c2.
From the system of first order conditions, it is straightforward to show that at
optimality the provider’s efforts satisfy
(











It is apparent that as δ increases the provider can satisfy i) equation (21) by either
increasing e∗2 and/or decreasing e
∗
1, and ii) equation (22) by either decreasing e
∗
2 and/or
increasing e∗1. Given that p [e1] is increasing concave in e1, it is more “efficient” for the
provider to satisfy equations (21) and (22) by decreasing e∗1. If δ exceeds a threshold,
3To enhance readability, we provide the technical derivations in the Appendix.
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then e∗1 may obtain small values that render the business unprofitable (as p [e1] may
be approaching zero), and therefore the provider may choose “extreme” solutions
such as to not offer the service. This is in accordance with our intuition. Specifically,
increasing values of δ imply that the amount the provider refunds the customers when
they deem their experience unsatisfying also increases. If δ > δ̂ exceeds a threshold δ̂
then the service becomes unprofitable for the provider. In the rest of the analysis we
focus on the cases in which δ < δ̂.
In order to further investigate the properties of e∗1 and e
∗
2 with respect to our
problem parameters, we evoke the use of the Implicit Function Theorem. We continue































∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = |H2| 6= 0, when
δ 6= δ̂, and that G1 and G2 have continuous partial derivatives with respect to all
the variables and parameters, the system of equations (23)-(24) defines the implicit
functions e∗1 = g1 (f, δ, c1, λ) and e
∗
2 = g2 (f, δ, c2, λ). Therefore, we can use the implicit
function rule and by doing so we arrive at Propositions 2-4.
Proposition 2 The optimal effort levels e∗1, and e
∗
2 decrease in the marginal cost of
efforts c1 and c2.
Proposition 2 establishes that the provider’s effort levels at Stage 1 and 2 decrease
as the marginal cost of Stage 1 and/or Stage 2 increase. This finding reveals the
dependency between the different stages in the service process. For instance, when
the marginal cost of the core of the service increases, the provider will most likely
decrease her effort, e2, at Stage 2. However, due to the possible disconfirmation,
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e∗2 − λe∗1, that customers may be bound to experience, this decrease needs to be
accompanied by a decrease in the effort level, e∗1, at Stage 1. Similarly, if the marginal
cost of effort at Stage 1 increases, then the provider reacts by decreasing the effort
level e∗1. In this case, the consequences of the experience reference effect are less
pronounced; therefore, the provider has a smaller incentive to exert great effort, e∗2,
at Stage 2. Although common wisdom would dictate that the effort a service provider
exerts at the core of a service should not affected by the characteristics of other stages
in the service process, we see that this is not true when the experience reference effect
is present. Clearly, decisions that ignore this dependency will result in suboptimal
service design.
Proposition 3 The optimal effort levels e∗1, and e
∗
2 increase in the price, f , of the
service offering.
Although, in our model the price f does not directly affect customer demand, we
see that increasing prices result in increasing provider efforts at Stage 1 and 2. The
reason is that increasing prices entitle customers to higher refunds. The provider
mitigates this effect by increasing her effort levels at both stages. An increase in the
effort at Stage 2 without an increase in the effort at Stage 1 would be futile, because
the provider’s effort, e∗1, at Stage 1 directly affects the revenue stream through the
probability p [e∗1].
Proposition 4 The optimal effort level e∗1, always decreases in the intensity of the
experience reference effect, λ. The optimal effort level e∗2, changes nonmonotonically
with respect to the intensity of the experience effect. If δ < δ̄(< δ̂), then the provider’s
effort at Stage 2 increases in λ. If δ > δ̄, then the provider’s effort at Stage 2 decreases
in λ.
In Proposition 4 we find that the optimal effort at Stage 1 decreases as the inten-
sity of the experience reference effect, λ ∈ (0, 1), increases. This is attributed to the
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fact that increasing λ implies that customers are more “sensitive” to possible discon-
firmation. In order to minimize the effect of disconfirmation, the provider decreases
the effort she exerts at Stage 1. The change in the effort at Stage 2 is more involved.
Specifically, we see that if δ is below a threshold δ̄, then the provider increases e∗2 with
respect to λ, in an effort to decrease customer disconfirmation (e∗2 − λe∗1). However,
this effect is reversed for higher values of δ(> δ̄). As we have argued in Proposition
1, higher values of δ drive a steep decrease in e∗1. For that reason, the provider can
enjoy cost savings by decreasing e2 without, however, causing an increase in customer
disconfirmation. This nonmonotonic behavior highlights the involved character of
optimal service design in the presence of the experience reference effect.
4.4 Discussion and Directions for Future Research
In this work we investigate the implications of the “experience reference effect” on the
design of services. The experience reference effect describes the fact that customers
may anchor to a reference point based on the experience they derive early in the service
process and evaluate subsequent experiences with respect to this point. Through a
stylized model, we are able to derive some fundamental service design insights whose
generality is guaranteed by the lack of restrictive functional forms. Our findings
capture the dependency of the stages in the services process and show that the optimal
efforts decrease with respect to the marginal cost of effort and increase with respect
to the price. The nonmonotonic behavior of the optimal efforts with respect to the
intensity of the experience reference effect is revealed, thus indicating the involved
nature of service design in the presence of experience reference effects. Additional
research is required to provide a more exhaustive treatment of the subject and offer
further useful managerial insights.
The inclusion of the dimension of competition can be particularly insightful. The
effect of competition can be tackled from different angles. For instance, providers may
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be considered to engage in price competition. In this case a price-based multinomial
logit (MNL) model can be used to determine the market share of each provider
(McFadden, 1973; Gaur and Park, 2007). In this context, it is not clear how the
interplay between price and profile of efforts will affect the provider’s design decisions
in equilibrium. The competitive presence of a rival provider can also be incorporated
by assuming that customers who abandon the service system of a provider at Stage
1 enter the service system of the rival provider at Stage 2. Similarly, it can also
be assumed that customers who at Stage 2 deem the overall experience unsatisfying
switch service providers by entering at Stage 1 of the rival provider.
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Appendix A
A1. Table of Notation.
Parameters Symbol Definition
n Total number of steps that compose the customer journey.
V Pi Functional benefit when the provider controls the i
th step.
σ2P Variance of the experience when the provider controls a step.
V Ci < V
P




P Variance of the experience when the customer performs a step.
δ ∈ (0, 1) Relative variability.
ρ ∈ (0, 1) Correlation between the realized experiences.
cV Pi , c ∈ (0, 1) Cost of providing the ith step.
Decision Variables Symbol Definition
p Price of service offered.
k ∈ {0, . . . , n} Number of touchpoints the provider controls.
A2. Table of Notation for the Case of Information Asymmetry.
Parameters Symbol Definition
θ ∈ {H,L} The type (High/Low) of the service provider.
cθV
P (θ) , cθ ∈ (0, 1) Cost for the θ-type provider to control a step.
Aθ The functional per-step surplus of type θ
may appropriate.
φ ∈ (0, 1) Customers’ prior belief that the provider’s type is H.
V E Extra value that customers derive when they infer that θ = H.
ks and k̄s The lower and upper bound that define the “mimicking” parabola.
If the high-type provider chooses to control a number of touchpoints
between these bounds then the low-type provider finds it profitable
to mimick such action and control the same number of touchpoints.
ke and k̄e The lower and upper bound that limit the actions
(i.e., number of touchpoints to control) the high-type provider
finds profitable take in order to signal her type.
kp and k̄p The lower and upper bound that define the “pooling” parabola.
If the high-type provider chooses to control a number of touchpoints
between these bounds then the low-type provider finds it profitable
to control the same number of touchpoints.
Decision Variables Symbol Definition
pθ Price charged from the θ-type provider in equilibrium.
0 ≤ kθ ≤ n Number of touchpoints the θ-type provider controls in equilibrium.
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A3. Proofs.
Lemma 1 The overall experience a customer derives from the service offering follows the
normal distribution with mean µV and standard deviation σV .
Proof of Lemma 1. The value that a customer derives upon completion of the service
process and his exit from the service system is given by equation (1). Taking the ex-

























= µV . With k
θ indicating the cardinality of Pθ the variance






















































Lemma 2 The risk averse customer obtains the following expected utility upon receiving




Proof of Lemma 2. We assume that customers are risk averse with the von-Neumann Mor-









Lemma 3 There exists a price p̄(k) ∈ R∗+ such that the total market share for the provider
is 1 if and only if p ≤ p̄(k). Otherwise, no customers deem the service beneficial and the
resulting market share is 0.




is monotonic increasing in
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Proof of Propositions 1&2. We first use an exchange argument to show that the
touchpoints should be assigned in decreasing order of Ai for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let A[j] indicate
the jth element of the ordering. Assume that the service provider decides to control k steps.
Additionally assume that the provider can use two different configurations (out of the
n!
(n−k)! possible configurations) for the choice of the touchpoints. In the first configuration
the touchpoints are chosen such that A[j−1] ≥ A[j], i.e., P1 =
{
A[1], A[2], . . . , A[k−1], A[k]
}
.
In the second configuration the touchpoints are chosen such that A[j−1] ≥ A[j] ≥ A[j+w],
∀w ∈ {1, ..., n− k− 1}, i.e., P2 =
{
A[1], A[2], . . . , A[k−1], A[k+w]
}
. It is evident from (4) that
Π (P2)−Π (P1) = A[k+w]−A[k] ≤ 0. Repeating this for any w and additional steps before k,
proves the claim that the provider’s optimal decision is to choose to control the touchpoints
of the first configuration.
We now intend to establish the concavity of the provider’s profit function (4). For
that reason we calculate the second order backward difference
(
Π (p = p̄(k∗ + 1), k∗ + 1)−




Π (p = p̄(k∗), k∗)−Π (p = p̄(k∗ − 1), k∗ − 1)
)





≤ 0. Therefore, our profit function is always concave in k. In
order now to identify the optimal integer k∗, we proceed to the calculation of the first order
forward and backward differences. Namely, Π (p = p̄(k∗ + 1), k∗ + 1) − Π (p = p̄(k∗), k∗) is
negative if and only if
r(1−δ)(−1−2k∗ρ+δ(−1+2(1+k∗−n)ρ))σ2P






= k. Similarly, Π (p = p̄(k∗), k∗)−Π (p = p̄(k∗ − 1), k∗ − 1)
is positive if and only if
r(1−δ)(−1−δ+2(1+k∗(−1+δ)−nδ)ρ)σ2P
2 + A[k∗] ≥ 0 which is equiva-





= k̄. It is also straightforward to show that
k̄ − k = 1. Since the concavity of (4) has already been established, the optimal inte-














∈ {1, ..., n − 1}.
Specifically, k̄ < n if and only if
2A[k∗]−r(1−δ)(1+δ+2(nδ−1)ρ)σ2P
2r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
− n < 0. The latter in-











− 1 ≥ 0 which is decreas-






= σ̄2P . It is easy to
establish that σ̄2P − σ2P =
4(n−1)ρA[k∗]
r(1+δ+2(n−1)ρ)(1+δ+2(n−1)δρ) ≥ 0. In the special case where
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. In this case, for small changes of ε > 0 magnitude and ∀k ∈
{1, ..., n} we have k̄ (δ = δ + ε) ≤ k̄ (δ) which implies
⌊







k∗ (δ = δ + ε) ≤ k∗ (δ). In similar fashion, we obtain: i) ∂k̄(r)∂r =
−A[k]
r2(1−δ)2ρσ2P
≤ 0 ∀σ2P , which
implies k∗ (r = r + ε) ≤ k∗ (r), ii) ∂k̄(n)∂n = −
δ
1−δ ≤ 0 ∀σ
2
P , which implies k
∗ (n = n+ ε) ≤
k∗ (n), iii) ∂k̄(ρ)∂ρ =
−2A[k]+r(1−δ2)σ2P
2r(1−δ)2ρ2σ2P






, which implies k∗ (ρ = ρ+ ε) ≤

















Proof of Proposition 4. In the rest of the analysis we use the real solution k∗ = k̄ as




which may result in slight abuse of notation
(slightly weaker or stronger inequalities).4 In what follows we use the notation Π (θ, φ′, p, k)
to indicate the profit of the θ-type provider when in equilibrium she charges a price p,
controls k steps and the customers assign a posterior probability φ′ to her being of high
type. For example, Π (H, 0, p, k) indicates the profit that the high-type provider derives
when she charges p, chooses to control k steps and the customers believe that she is a low-
type provider. Under the assumptions stated in §2.4.2, the values of µV and σ2V calculated
in Lemma 1 are now given by µ′V = µV + φ




V . In order for the price to
signal type, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the same number of steps k are: i)
Π (L, 0, p̄(k), k) ≥ Π
(
L, 1, pH(k), k
)
or equivalently p̄(k)− kcLV P ≥ pH(k)− kcLV P + V E
which is true when pH(k) ≤ p̄(k) − V E and ii) Π
(
H, 1, pH(k), k
)
≥ Π (H, 0, p̄(k), k) or
equivalently pH(k)− kcHV P + V E ≥ p̄(k)− kcHV P which holds when pH(k) ≥ p̄(k)− V E .
Therefore, we conclude that in equilibrium the price pH(k) = p̄(k)− V E can indeed signal
4Games where the players’ sets of actions are integer points belong to relatively new class of
strategic games called integer programming games. Such games have recently attracted growing
interest from researchers (Köppe et al., 2008); however, such an analysis lies beyond the scope of our
paper. Instead, we use the real proxy to focus on the managerial implications. As already shown
in the proof of Propositions 1&2, it is fair to assume that moderate levels of r and σ2P result in a





k̄ − k = 1, assures us that the use of k̄ instead of bk̄c does not practically change the nature of our
results.
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= p̄(kH)− cHkHV P + V E −
(
pH(kH)− cHkHV P + V E
)
= V E > 0.
Lemma 4 In any separating equilibrium the design choice of the high-type provider kH
is such that: (i) kH ≥ k̄s(V E) or kH ≤ ks(V E); the bounds k̄s(V E) and ks(V E) define
a “mimicking parabola” inside of which the low-type provider always mimicks the high-

























define a “participation” region where the high-type provider can profitably seek a
separation equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4. A necessary condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is
that the low-type provider should prefer to reveal her type over mimicking the high-




































. We assume that if customers infer that the








































. Also by equating ks(V
E) with ks(V
E) we obtain
V̄ E = − r(1−δ)
2ρσ2P
8 < 0, which indicates the minimum V
E at which the high-type provider
can be mimicked by the low-type provider. The fact that V̄ E is negative means that mimick-
ing is always possible. For the separating equilibrium to exist it suffices that the high-type
provider never finds it profitable to deviate from it. If the customer observes such a devia-
tion he infers that the provider is a low-type one. Thus, the best alternative for a deviating





























































and AH −AL = (cL − cH)V P .
Proof of Proposition 5. In order to calculate the maximum V E at which the high-type
provider can employ the full information design strategy, we identify the following two cases:
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= V̂ E ≥ 0.
II. When cH > cL, then k̄(H) = k̄s(V
E)
a. at V̂ E ≤ 0 if cH − cL <
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
2V P
. Thus, it is never profitable for the provider
to employ the full information strategy.
b. at V̂ E if cH−cL >
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
2V P
. The provider is able to employ the full information













































. With some simple but rather tedious algebraic calculations, we can
show when these requirements are satisfied. Specifically, by utilizing equations (25)-(28)
k̄e(V
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I. If cH < cL then k̄e(V























criterion. Specifically, consider the equilibrium according to which kL = k̄(L) and






. The customer knows the that the low-type provider has
no incentive to deviate from her equilibrium. For that reason, if the customer observes
a deviation from k to k′ < k, he infers that the high-type provider was responsible for
it. Given the provider’s concave profit function and the fact that separation is costly,
the high-type provider indeed has an incentive to deviate from k to k′, violating in
this way the intuitive criterion. The only k that the provider has no incentive to








− ε falls inside the
mimicking parabola.
II. If cH > cL, then k̄e(V





















fail the intuitive criterion. The resulting separating
equilibrium is ks(V
E).











in V E , therefore k̄s(V
E) ≥ k∗(H) ∀V E ≥ V̂ E . Using the same rationale, it is also
straightforward to establish that ks(V
E) ≤ k∗(H) ∀ V E ≥ V̂ E . Additionally, by solv-
ing k̄s(V


































2 . It is easy to see that ks
(
V E = 0
)
= k (L) > 0
and k̄s
(
V E = 0
)





ing and increasing respectively in V E , then both V̂ En and V̂
E
0 are positive.
Proof of Proposition 7. The low-type provider does not find it profitable to mim-










L, 1, pH , kH
)
.


















∀V E > V̂ En . Profit is increasing in pH ,
therefore the service provider faces the maximization problem, max
kH ,pH
pH − kHcHV P + V E
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P − V E . After substituting the constraint






− k̄(L)cLV P + kH (cL − cH)V P
which is linear in kH and results in the two cases according to which: i) if cL < cH
then kH = 0 and pH = 0 and ii) if cL > cH then k








P − V E < p̄ (n) ∀V E > V̂ En . For the latter case, in order to verify that









, we compare Π
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= p̄ (k(L)) − k̄(L)cHV P . Given cL > cH and kH =
n > k̄ (L) it easy to show that Π
(











































E) are defined in Lemma 4. The two sets are
equal when the customers’ prior belief φ that the provider is of high type converges to cer-
tainty φ→ 1.
Lemma 5, similar to Lemma 4, defines the “pooling parabola” inside of which a high-type
service provider may be inclined to follow a pooling strategy, that is, define an uninformative
service design. For this to happen, a low-type provider should not find it profitable to deviate

















satisfies this prerequisite. The “pooling”
parabola is such that it is always inside the “mimicking” parabola.
Proof of Lemma 5. A pooling equilibrium may exist only when the provider that
bears the highest marginal cost does not find it profitable to deviate to her full infor-


































































. Additionally, by equating kp(V
E) with k̄p(V




0, which indicates the minimum V E at which pooling can occur. As expected, V E is nega-
tive which implies that pooling is possible ∀V E .
Proof of Proposition 8. Applying the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 5 we







. If V E ≥ V̂ E(φ) then k̄(H) < k̄p(V E)
when cH − cL <
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
2V P
and k̄(H) > kp(V
















and the low-type provider is not willing to pool. While






the low-type provider is always better off by pooling as
opposed to revealing her true type, the high-type provider would always choose the same
k̄(H) number of steps. For any kP 6= k̄(H) the high-type provider would have an incentive
to deviate to k̄(H) and thus break the equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. To prove Corollary 1 we need to compare for each case the profit
a high-type provider makes in a separating equilibrium (if attainable) with the profit she
makes in pooling equilibrium. We proceed case by case as follows.
I. In Proposition 7 we identify the actions a high-type provider must take in order to
signal her type. We compare now the profit resulting from the proposed actions
with the profit resulting from a pooling equilibrium. We find that if the customers’
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III. This case is trivially true since we have already established that a separating
equilibrium is not attainable.
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IV. The proof is the same as in Case II, where after replacing k̄H with kH we obtain
φ ≥ φ̄+
(cH − cL)V P
√





In this setting, once customers infer that θ = H, then they derive an extra value kV E ,





Figures 24-27 depict the signaling strategies of the high-type provider. The expressions for
the new bounds are shown below.
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(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4




































(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 24: The most favorable situations for a high-type service provider in the
presence of information asymmetry. Type can be successfully signaled through the




for n = 20, r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7,
σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16 and ρ = 0.46.
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(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4







































(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 25: Signaling process efficiency through the control of more touchpoints (on
the left) and expertise based outcome through the control of fewer touchpoints (on
the right) when V E > V̂ E and n = 20, r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31,
δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46.






































(a) φ = 0.1






































(b) φ = 0.35
Figure 26: Pooling parabola and the existence of a pooling equilibrium when n = 20,
r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46, cH = 0.3, cL = 0.4.

















































(a) cH = 0.3 and cL = 0.4

















































(b) cH = 0.4 and cL = 0.3
Figure 27: Optimal signaling strategies of the high-type service provider when
n = 20, r = 0.5, V P = 2.26, V C = 0.7, σ2P = 0.31, δ = 0.16, ρ = 0.46.
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Appendix B
B1. Table of Notation.
Table 5: Notation.
Parameters Symbol Units Definition
ā = 1− a (0,1) Service level (vehicle availability)
under Membership.
D Time Periods (e.g., years) Vehicle Useful Life.
T Units of Time (e.g., hours) Length of the Time Period.
q Total Vehicle Usage in a Time period (e.g., hours) Total Time that a Customer
Needs to Have a Vehicle “Off-Base.”
ξ Times per Time Period Total Number of Times a Customer
Uses the Vehicle in a Given Time Period.
λ̄ Customers per Unit of Time Compound Arrival Rate.
τ̄ Time per Use (e.g., hours) Expected Duration of Each Vehicle Use.
Λ(·) λ̄τ̄ Workload.
ω (0,1) Fraction of the Usage Time
that Operating Cost Accrues.
h (0,1) Percentage of the Vehicle Production
Cost Retained over D Periods.
pO $ per Unit of Usage Time Vehicle Operating Cost (e.g., gas cost).
c $ Vehicle Production Cost.
N = nH + nL Customers Total Customer Population.
yi $ Transportation Budget of the i Segment.
b Usage Time (e.g., hours)/$ Demand Slope Measuring the Change
in Usage per Unit Change in Price.
Decision Variables Units Definition
FO $ Annualized Purchase Cost.
FM $ Yearly Membership Fee.
pM $ per Unit of Usage Time Usage Price Under Membership.
S Vehicles Number of Vehicles Offered
Under Membership.
B2. Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility Constraints After
the Introduction of Membership.
- (Ownership, Ownership): The High segment chooses Ownership and the Low
segment chooses Ownership. In this case, constraints (29)-(31) need to hold
(Figure 10(a)).
FO ≤ F̄LO = yL − ωpOd (29)
Ū∗HO ≥ 1FM≤F̄HM Ū
∗
HM (30)
Ū∗LO ≥ 1FM≤F̄LM Ū
∗
LM (31)
The individual rationality constraint of the high segment towards Ownership is
trivially satisfied by the individual rationality constraint of the low segment.
- (Membership, Membership): The High segment chooses Membership and the
Low segment chooses Membership. This case can exist if and only if constraints
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(32)-(34) are satisfied (Figure 10(d)).
FM ≤ F̄LM = yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (32)
Ū∗HM ≥ 1FO≤F̄HO Ū
∗
HO (33)
Ū∗LM ≥ 1FO≤F̄LO Ū
∗
LO (34)
Once again the individual rationality constraint of the low segment satisfies the
individual rationality constraint of the high segment too.
- (Membership, Ownership): The High segment chooses Membership and the Low
segment chooses Ownership. This case can exist if and only if constraints (35)-
(38) are satisfied.
FM ≤ F̄HM = yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (35)
FO ≤ F̄LO = yL − ωpOd (36)
Ū∗HM ≥ Ū∗HO (37)
Ū∗LO ≥ 1FM≤F̄LM Ū
∗
LM (38)
- (Ownership,∅): The High segment chooses Ownership and the Low segment
does not participate. In this case, constraints (39)-(42) need to hold (Figure
10(b)).
FO ≤ F̄HO = yH − ωpOd (39)
Ū∗HO ≥ 1FM≤F̄HM Ū
∗
HM (40)
FM > F̄LM = yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (41)
FO > F̄LO = yL − ωpOd (42)
- (Membership,∅): The High segment chooses Membership and the Low segment
does not participate. This case can exist if and only if constraints (43)-(46) are
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satisfied.
FM ≤ F̄HM = yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (43)
Ū∗HM ≥ 1FO≤F̄HO Ū
∗
HO (44)
FM > F̄LM = yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (45)
FO > F̄LO = yL − ωpOd (46)
- (∅,∅): None of the segments participates. Constraints (47)-(48) need to hold.
FM > F̄HM = yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d (47)
FO > F̄HO = yH − ωpOd (48)
B3. The Manufacturer’s Maximization Problem Under Different Market
Configurations.








s.t FO ≤ yL − ωpOd
Ū∗HO ≥ 1FM≤F̄HM Ū
∗
HM
Ū∗LO ≥ 1FM≤F̄LM Ū
∗
LM

























FM ≤ yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
Ū∗HM ≥ 1FO≤F̄HO Ū
∗
HO










M = nL + nH .






















FM ≤ yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
FO ≤ yL − ωpOd
Ū∗HM ≥ Ū∗HO
Ū∗LO ≥ 1FM≤F̄LM Ū
∗
LM




Π = (DFO − (1− h)c)nH
s.t FO ≤ yH − ωpOd
Ū∗HO ≥ 1FM≤F̄HM Ū
∗
HM
FM > yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
FO > yL − ωpOd
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FM ≤ yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
Ū∗HM ≥ 1FO≤F̄HO Ū
∗
HO
FM > yL −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
FO > yL − ωpOd
- ∅, ∅: None of the segments participates.
FM > yH −
(
pM + (pa − pM) a
)
d
FO > yH − ωpOd
B4. Proofs.
Proof of Lemma 2. The prerequisite is met if and only if q̄ij ≥ d, which is simplified
to Fj ≤ yi −
(





Proof of Proposition 1. Define the unconstrained maximizer of (5) by equation

















= {qij : yi = Cj (qij)}
=
yi − Fj
(pj + (pa − pj)aj)ωj
(50)
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For all Fj ≤ F̄ij, the optimization problem (5) can be restated as
max
qij
Ūij = yi + Uij(qij)− Cj(qij) (51)
s.t qij ≥ d
qij ≤ q̄ij
The Lagrangean of (51) is given by (52).









+ γj − Fj −
(
pj + (pa − pj) aj
)
ωjqij + µ1 (qij − d)− µ2 (qij − q̄ij)








pj + (pa − pj) aj
)




+ µ1 − µ2 = 0 (53)





), the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for optimality (Kuhn-Tucker conditions) are that the first-order condition (53)
is satisfied and µ1 (qij − d) = 0, µ2 (qij − q̄ij) = 0, µ1 ≥ 0 and µ2 ≥ 0. There are three
candidate solutions to (51):
I. qij = d. Then µ1 > 0 and µ2 = 0 which hold for
d > q̃ij ⇔
d̄ < d+ b
(
pj + (pa − pj)aj
)
ωij. (54)
II. qij = q̄ij. Then µ2 > 0 and µ1 = 0 which hold for
q̃ij > q̄ij ⇔
d̄ > b
(




(pj + (pa − pj)aj)ωj
. (55)
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(pj + (pa − pj)aj)ωj





Without imposing any restrictive assumptions on the parameters we can express q∗ij
compactly as in (57).
q∗ij = min
{
max {q̃ij, d} , q̄ij
}
. (57)
Proof of Proposition 2. The optimal usage q∗ij is nondecreasing in yi. Further-
more, for Fj > 0 and yi = 0 none of the segments can participate in Ownership or

















= p̂M . (58)
If (58) holds, then a unique crossing point ȳi is guaranteed to exist such that
q∗iO > q
∗
iM for every yi > ȳi.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since q∗iM is nonincreasing in pM and q
∗
iO is independent
of pM , it suffices to establish that q
∗
iM (pM = 0) > q
∗
iO. The cases in Proposition 3
correspond to the following scenarios:




iM (pM = 0).
II. q∗iM (pM = 0) = d̄− abpa and q∗iO < q∗iM (pM = 0).
III. q∗iM (pM = 0) =
yi−FM
apa
and q∗iO < q
∗
iM (pM = 0) .
If any of the above cases holds, then a unique crossing point p̄M is guaranteed to
exist such that q∗iM > q
∗
iO for every pM < p̄M .
Proof of Lemma 3. Under the first option the manufacturer sets FO = F̄HO and
extracts ΠO =
(
(yH − ωpOd)D− (1−h)c
)
nH , while under the second option she sets
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FO = F̄LO and extracts Π
O =
(




. By a simple
comparison of the two profits we see that selling to both segments is more profitable
if and only if (59) and (60) hold together.
nL >
nHD (yH − yL)








B5. Estimation of the Parameters.
In what follows we provide details regarding the sources and methods we used for
the calculation of our parameters.
- D: Vehicle Useful Life.
According to Santos et al. (2011) almost 60% of the household vehicles in the


























































Figure 28: Household vehicles by type and age (adapted by Santos et al., 2011).
Automobile Association (2011) and Binder (2010) assume, respectively, a 5 and
6 year useful vehicle lifetime to calculate car ownership costs. Given the fleet
composition of Zipcar (in terms of production year), a vehicle lifetime greater
than five years is rather unrealistic for our setting. Therefore, we use D = 5
years.
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- c: Vehicle Production Cost.
Information regarding the production cost of auto manufacturers is rarely pub-
licly available. Therefore, we use a combination of different sources. Specifically,
using the wrds-Wharton Research Data Services, we extract data regarding the
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) for Ford and Toyota during the periods 2008-2009
and 2007-2008, respectively, while from Binder (2010) we obtain the correspond-
ing Worldwide Wholesale Sales (WWS). In Table 6 we calculate the vehicle
production cost as c = COGS/WWS.
Table 6: Estimation of the vehicle production cost.
Company Year Revenue COGS WWS Revenue/COGS COGS/WWS
Ford 2008 $146,277,000,000 $115,883,000,000 5,399,000 1.26 $21,464
Ford 2009 $118,308,000,000 $95,836,000,000 4,817,000 1.23 $19,895
Toyota 2007 $262,394,000,000 $199,912,000,000 8,913,000 1.31 $22,429
Toyota 2008 $208,995,000,000 $172,663,000,000 7,567,000 1.21 $22,818
To account for the fact that the above data aggregate a variety of vehicle types
and models we use a wider range of production costs, that is c = {$15 ×
103, $22.5× 103, $25× 103}.
- h ∈ (0,1): Percent of the Vehicle Production Cost Retained over D Periods.
In order to estimate h we use data from the American Automobile Association
(2011) for the period 2005-2011. Table 7 indicates the ownership cost that the
American Automobile Association (2011) estimated for the years 2005-2011.
The vehicle depreciation cost is based on the difference between, the new vehicle
selling price and the trade-in value at the end of five years. The finance charge
is based on a five year loan at 6% interest with a 10% down payment. Using
this information, in Table 8 we calculate the average vehicle selling prices that
correspond to each vehicle type of Table 7. For instance, according to Table 7,
in 2011 the finance charge for a small sedan was $584. We use the CUMIPMT
function of Excel to calculate the finance charge that corresponds to a five year
loan at 6% interest with a 10% Selling Price down payment. With the help of
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Solver we are able to calculate the Selling Price that sets to zero the difference
between the output of CUMIPMT and $584. The resulting selling price is
$20,282. Building on the calculation of the average selling prices and assuming
straight line depreciation, we also estimate h′ ∈ (0, 1), which represents the
value that the vehicle retains after five years as a percent of the selling price
(i.e., R = h′Selling Price). Using the same example, from Table 7 we see
that in 2011 the depreciation cost over a five year period for a small sedan was
$2,560. Therefore, h′ = 20,282−5×2,560
20,282
= 0.37.
In our model, the resale value is expressed as a fraction of the production





6 for the values of Revenue/COGS). By trying different combinations of h′
and Revenue/COGS we find that the values h = {0.3, 0.4, 0.5} are realistic
representations of the percentage of the vehicle production cost that is retained
by the end of a five year period.
- pO: Vehicle Operating Cost.
Once again, we use data from the American Automobile Association (2011)
for the period 2005-2011. Table 9 shows the vehicle operating costs that the
American Automobile Association (2011) estimated for the years 2005-2011.
However, the costs shown in Table 9 are expressed in ¢/mile. In our model,
vehicle usage is expressed in units of time; therefore, it is necessary to convert
the operating costs from ¢/mile to $/hour. We perform this conversion by as-
suming an average driving speed of 30 miles/hour, which is a typical assumption
in transportation studies (Frost & Sullivan, 2010; Santos et al., 2011). Table 10
exhibits some of the descriptive statistics of the vehicle operating costs during
2005-2011 expressed in $/hour. The values range from as low as 3.63$/hour to
as high as 6.05$/hour. To account for different driving styles and within-year
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Table 7: Vehicle ownership costs.
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $951 $948 $1,006 $968
0 License, registration, taxes $438 $577 $769 $595
1 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,560 $3,534 $5,091 $3,728
1 Finance charge $584 $796 $1,089 $823
$4,533 $5,855 $7,955 $6,114
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $1,005 $1,004 $1,084 $1,031
0 License, registration, taxes $427 $583 $745 $585
1 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,384 $3,451 $4,828 $3,554
0 Finance charge $565 $803 $1,050 $806
$4,381 $5,841 $7,707 $5,976
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $948 $957 $1,022 $976
0 License, registration, taxes $419 $572 $711 $567
0 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,430 $3,401 $4,554 $3,462
9 Finance charge $553 $786 $998 $779
$4,350 $5,716 $7,285 $5,784
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $949 $907 $973 $943
0 License, registration, taxes $410 $562 $690 $554
0 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,332 $3,355 $4,275 $3,321
8 Finance charge $541 $770 $963 $758
$4,232 $5,594 $6,901 $5,576
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $968 $955 $1,032 $985
0 License, registration, taxes $401 $544 $668 $538
0 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,461 $3,394 $4,321 $3,392
7 Finance charge $527 $743 $929 $733
$4,357 $5,636 $6,950 $5,648
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $892 $902 $982 $925
0 License, registration, taxes $397 $551 $658 $535
0 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,503 $3,449 $4,224 $3,392
6 Finance charge $511 $739 $899 $716
$4,303 $5,641 $6,763 $5,569
Ownership Costs ($/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Full-coverage insurance $1,456 $1,195 $1,212 $1,288
0 License, registration, taxes $333 $390 $445 $389
0 Depreciation (15,000 miles annually) $2,985 $4,005 $4,647 $3,879
5 Finance charge $553 $740 $925 $739
$5,327 $6,330 $7,229 $6,295
gasoline price volatility, we use a wider range, that is pO = {4, 6.5, 9}$/hour.
- pa: Cost of not Finding a Vehicle Available.
We assume that every time customers cannot find a vehicle available they resort
to alternative modes of transportation such as taxicabs. Therefore, in order to
estimate pa we collect data regarding typical taxicab fares. Based on information
acquired from Schaller Consulting (2006), we construct Table 11 which shows
taxicab fares (in terms of $/trip) in major US cities.5 Assuming an average
driving speed of 30 miles/hour we convert the $/trip fares of Table 11 into
5In Table 11, Average US Trip refers to 5 miles and 5 minutes of wait time or 0.17 hours assuming
30 miles/hour, Short Trip refers to 2.8 miles and 4.77 minutes of wait time or 0.09 hours assuming
30 miles/hour, and Long Trip refers to 12 miles and 5 minutes of wait time or 0.40 hours assuming
30 miles/hour (Schaller Consulting, 2006).
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Table 8: Estimation of the average selling price and the percent of it retained after
five years.
2011 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $20,282 $27,644 $37,820 $28,582
h′ 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.35
2010 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $19,622 $27,888 $36,466 $27,992
h′ 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.37
2009 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $19,205 $27,297 $34,660 $27,054
h′ 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.36
2008 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $18,788 $26,741 $33,444 $26,325
h′ 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.37
2007 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $18,302 $25,804 $32,263 $25,456
h′ 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33
2006 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $17,747 $25,665 $31,222 $24,878
h′ 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.32
2005 Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Average Selling Price $19,205 $25,700 $32,124 $25,676
h′ 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.24
$/hour fares which we show in Table 12. The values in Table 12 range from as
low as 54.95$/hour to as high as 144.89$/hour. We choose the average values
to estimate pa = {69.80ω, 81.46ω, 104.6ω}$/hour.6
- b: Demand Slope Measuring the Change in Usage per Unit Change in Price.
With respect to b, in Table 13 we utilize information regarding the Average
Annual Miles Traveled per Vehicle during 2008-2005 from Binder (2010) and
the corresponding average operating costs from Table 9. A simple linear regres-
sion between the Average Annual Hours Traveled per Vehicle and the Average
Operating Cost ($/hour) reveals that b = 26.6 (see Figure 29). Therefore, we
choose to use b = {15, 25, 35}hours/$.
We can arrive to similar estimations by adopting a slightly different approach
6We include the parameter ω because taxicab charges accrue with the actual driving
time/distance. That is, the values of pa may actually differ across different driving profiles.
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Table 9: Vehicle operating costs.
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 10.05 12.82 14.16 12.34
0 Maintenance 4.11 4.29 4.93 4.44
1 Tires 0.67 1.11 1.09 0.96
1 14.83 18.22 20.18 17.74
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 9.24 11.97 12.88 11.36
0 Maintenance 4.21 4.42 5.00 4.54
1 Tires 0.65 0.91 0.94 0.83
0 14.10 17.30 18.82 16.74
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 8.21 10.54 11.51 10.09
0 Maintenance 4.26 4.51 4.92 4.56
0 Tires 0.61 0.87 0.82 0.77
9 13.08 15.92 17.25 15.42
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 9.39 12.34 13.28 11.67
0 Maintenance 3.98 4.67 5.07 4.57
0 Tires 0.55 0.85 0.77 0.72
8 13.92 17.86 19.12 16.97
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 7.40 9.40 10.00 8.93
0 Maintenance 4.50 4.70 5.50 4.90
0 Tires 0.50 0.80 0.70 0.67
7 12.40 14.90 16.20 14.50
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 8.00 9.80 10.70 9.50
0 Maintenance 4.50 4.90 5.40 4.93
0 Tires 0.50 0.80 0.70 0.67
6 13.00 15.50 16.80 15.10
Operating Costs (¢/mile) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
2 Gas 6.90 8.50 9.30 8.23
0 Maintenance 4.70 5.80 5.40 5.30
0 Tires 0.50 0.70 0.50 0.57
5 12.10 15.00 15.20 14.10
that involves the price elasticity of gasoline demand. Specifically, the price (pt)






linear demand function, dt = a − bpt, we obtain ∂dt∂pt = −b and therefore, b =
−dt
pt
εt. If we set εt = −0.34, which is the short run price elasticity calculated
by Brons et al. (2008) and for different values of dt
pt
use the 2006-2008 values
for the Average Annual Hours Traveled per Vehicle and the Average Operating
Cost ($/hour) found in Table 13, then we obtain values for b that range from
26.25 to 32.02. Therefore, b can still be realistically represented by the set
{15, 25, 35}hours/$.
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of vehicle operating costs in $/hour.
MIN-Operating Costs ($/hour) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Gas $2.07 $2.55 $2.79 $2.47
Maintenance $1.19 $1.29 $1.48 $1.33
Tires $0.15 $0.21 $0.15 $0.17
$3.63 $4.47 $4.56 $4.23
Median-Operating Costs ($/hour) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Gas $2.46 $3.16 $3.45 $3.03
Maintenance $1.28 $1.40 $1.52 $1.37
Tires $0.17 $0.26 $0.23 $0.22
$3.92 $4.78 $5.18 $4.63
Mean-Operating Costs ($/hour) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Gas $2.54 $3.23 $3.51 $3.09
Maintenance $1.30 $1.43 $1.55 $1.43
Tires $0.17 $0.26 $0.24 $0.22
$4.00 $4.92 $5.30 $4.74
MAX-Operating Costs ($/hour) Small Sedan Medium Sedan Large Sedan Average
Gas $3.02 $3.85 $4.25 $3.70
Maintenance $1.41 $1.74 $1.65 $1.59
Tires $0.20 $0.33 $0.33 $0.29
$4.45 $5.47 $6.05 $5.32
- yi∀i ∈ {H,L}: Transportation Budget of the i Segment.
As reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011), households in the US
spend approximately 13% of their income on transportation (see Table 4.4).
We use this observation in conjunction with the US income distribution as
found in Proctor (2011) and we construct Table 15. In Table 15, we multiply
13% by the median income of each bracket to calculate the transportation bud-
get of the respective income bracket. Cervero et al. (2007) survey car share
users whose median income is $50,000. We focus on a broader customer base
by focusing on the C, D, E, and F brackets. Specifically, we use (yH , yL) =
{($5.525× 103, $3.900× 103), ($8.125× 103, $5.525× 103), ($11.375× 103, $8.125× 103)}.
- ni∀i ∈ {H,L}: Customer Population in the i Segment.
From Table 15 we can also see that nD/nC = 1.28, nE/nD = 1.27, and
nF/nE = 0.64. Therefore, we representatively choose nH/nL = {1.50, 0.75}.
Regarding the estimation of the total customer population N = nH + nL, we
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Table 11: Taxicab fares for typical trips in major US cities ($/trip).
City Average US Trip Short Trip Long Trip
Honolulu $19.75 $13.04 $40.75
San Diego $16.17 $10.59 $33.67
Miami $16.10 $10.73 $32.90
San Francisco $15.90 $10.85 $31.65
Boston $15.45 $10.08 $32.25
Los Angeles $15.00 $10.07 $30.40
Seattle $14.80 $10.29 $28.80
Las Vegas $14.75 $10.27 $28.75
St. Louis $14.30 $9.81 $28.30
Philadelphia $14.17 $9.47 $28.87
Atlanta $14.00 $9.52 $28.00
Orlando $13.38 $8.89 $27.38
Minneapolis $13.37 $9.11 $26.67
Denver $13.23 $8.74 $27.23
New York $13.10 $8.65 $27.10
Phoenix $12.87 $8.83 $27.10
Houston $12.85 $8.81 $25.45
Chicago $12.70 $8.66 $25.30
DC Suburbs $12.08 $8.35 $23.70
Dallas $12.55 $8.52 $25.15
New Orleans $11.80 $8.21 $23.00
Detroit $11.65 $8.07 $22.85
Baltimore $11.60 $7.99 $22.80
Cleveland $10.78 $7.21 $21.98
proceed by first estimating the geographic area that Zipcar covers through its
car sharing fleet in the greater Midtown area in Atlanta, Fulton County, GA.
From Figures (30(a)) and (30(b)) we can approximate this area as 2.81 sq. miles.
According to the Georgia Department of Labor (2006) the population density of
Fulton County is 1,796 people/sq. mile, hence we can easily calculate the total
customer population as approximately N = nH + nL = 5, 000. Combining our
estimations regarding, nH/nL and nH +nL it is straightforward to establish the
use of (nH , nL) = {(2.807× 103, 1.951× 103), (2.193× 103, 3.049× 103)}. It is
worth mentioning that, ceteris paribus, the manufacturer’s optimal decisions
will remain the same for different values of N . Specifically, it is the relative size
of the segments that influences the manufacturer’s decisions as opposed to the
total size N of the market.
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Table 12: Taxicab fares for typical trips in major US cities ($/hour).
City Average US Trip Short Trip Long Trip
Honolulu $116.18 $144.89 $101.88
San Diego $95.12 $117.67 $84.18
Miami $94.71 $119.22 $82.25
San Francisco $93.53 $120.56 $79.13
Boston $90.88 $112.00 $80.63
Los Angeles $88.24 $111.89 $76.00
Seattle $87.06 $114.33 $72.00
Las Vegas $86.76 $114.11 $71.88
St. Louis $84.12 $109.00 $70.75
Philadelphia $83.35 $105.22 $72.18
Atlanta $82.35 $105.78 $70.00
Orlando $78.71 $98.78 $68.45
Minneapolis $78.65 $101.22 $66.68
Denver $77.82 $97.11 $68.08
New York $77.06 $96.11 $67.75
Phoenix $75.71 $98.11 $67.75
Houston $75.59 $97.89 $63.63
Chicago $74.71 $96.22 $63.25
DC Suburbs $71.06 $92.78 $59.25
Dallas $73.82 $94.67 $62.88
New Orleans $69.41 $91.22 $57.50
Detroit $68.53 $89.67 $57.13
Baltimore $68.24 $88.78 $57.00
Cleveland $63.41 $80.11 $54.95
Average $81.46 $104.06 $69.80
Table 13: Annual miles and hours traveled per vehicle with respect to the average
operating cost.
Year Average Annual Miles Average Annual Hours Average Average
Traveled per Vehicle Traveled per Vehicle Operating Cost Operating Cost
(30miles/hour) ($/mile) ($/hour)
2008 11,788 393 0.17 5.09
2007 12,293 410 0.15 4.35
2006 12,427 414 0.15 4.53
2005 12,510 417 0.14 4.23
- FM : Annual Membership Fee.
In order to estimate FM we survey the membership fees charged by various
car sharing providers. In Table 16, we see that FM can be as low as $0 and
as high as $360 (multiple values of FM for the same provider are associated
with the different value plans offered by the specific provider). We choose
FM = {$50, $150, $250} as a representative range of annual membership fees.
- ā: Service Level (Vehicle Availability) Under Membership.
Since no data regarding the availability of the car sharing vehicles are publicly
available, we choose a relatively wide range ā = {90%, 95%, 98%}. We consider
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Average Operating Cost ($/hour)
Figure 29: Annual hours traveled per vehicle with respect to the average operating
cost.
Table 14: Average annual household expenditures and income.
2008 2009 2010
Income before taxes $63,563 $62,857 $62,481
Average annual expenditures $50,486 $49,067 $48,109
Food $6,443 $6,372 $6,129
Housing $17,109 $16,895 $16,557
Apparel and Services $1,801 $1,725 $1,700
Transportation $8,604 $7,685 $7,677
Healthcare $2,976 $3,126 $3,157
Entertainment $2,835 $2,693 $2,504
Cash contributions $1,737 $1,723 $1,633
Personal insurance and pensions $5,605 $5,471 $5,373
All other expenditures $3,376 $3,404 $3,379
any values outside this range rather unrealistic. Specifically, for service levels
below 90%, Membership cannot be regarded as a viable alternative to Owner-
ship, while service levels above 98% essentially imply no “stockouts” (refer to
Frei (2005) for evidence to the contrary).
- γj∀j ∈ {O,M}: Intrinsic Preference to Own or be a Member.
We choose to focus on the purely economic drivers (as opposed to behavioral
drivers; e.g., endowment effect or environmental consciousness) that shape cus-
tomers’ transportation choices. For that reason we set (γO, γM) = (0, 0).
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Table 15: Income distribution in 2010.
A B C D E F G H I
Under $15,000 $25,000 $35,000 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000+
$15,000 to $24,999 to $34,999 to $49,999 to $74,999 to $99,999 to $149,999 to $199,999
Percent
of Population 13.70% 12% 10.90% 13.90% 17.70% 11.40% 12.10% 4.50% 3.90%
Median
Income $20,000 $30,000 $42,500 $62,500 $87,500 $125,000 $175,000
Transportation
Budget (13%) $2,600 $3,900 $5,525 $8,125 $11,375 $16,250 $22,750
Table 16: Membership fees charged by different car sharing providers. Fees may
vary within providers due to multiple value plans offered.




I-GO Car Sharing $0/$180/$360
Zipcar $0/$60 




Which based on Google Earth corresponds to 
                                                          
7
 http://www.zipcar.com/atlanta/find-cars 
(a) Available car shari g l ts in the greater Midtown area
(Zipcar, 2012b).
 
Area of polygon=1.31sq.miles 
Area of circle=2.81sq.miles 
Combining the latter with the population density of Fulton County we effectively have 
nH+nL=2.81*1,796=5056.76  (let us assume 5000  for notational ease) potential customers. 
Regarding the mix of “poor” and “rich” customers we can use the following table retrieved 




                                                          
8
 Available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf 
A B C D 
(b) Aerial representation of the covered
area.
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The second principal minor of the Hessian can be calculated as follows:























































































)2 .= δ̂ > 0
When δ < δ̂ the first order conditions (61) and (62) are also sufficient. Solving ∂Π∂e1 = 0
and ∂Π∂e2 = 0 simultaneously, we obtain(







= c1 + λc2.




































































































































































































































































































= δ̄ > 0.
We are now interested in identifying the relationship between δ̂ and δ̄. With some simple
but rather tedious algebraic manipulations we can establish that,










































< 0 ∀λ > 0.
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